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Securing Truth for Power:
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policy Making

Abstract

Whether regulating mutual funds or chemical manufacturers, government’s policy
decisions depend on information possessed by industry. But it is not in any industry’s
interests to share information that will lead to costly regulations. So how do government
regulators secure needed information from industry? Since information disclosed by any
firm cannot be retrieved and can be used to regulate the entire sector, industry faces a
collective action problem in maintaining silence. While collective silence is easy to
maintain if all firms’ interests are aligned, their payoffs for disclosure can vary due to
heterogeneous effects of regulation and heterogeneous beliefs about the regulator’s
expected actions with or without any given information. The regulator’s strategy is
therefore to resist or break down industry’s collective silence, either by (1) exploiting
asymmetries in firms’ interests in disclosure, or (2) selectively rewarding or punishing
individual firms to create incentives for disclosure. Both of these strategies work best
when pursued informally, in less visible ways, since other firms can be expected to inflict
retribution on any squealer. Although informal relationships have been long deplored
due to the risk of regulatory bias or capture, our analysis shows how they can be
beneficial to government in playing the information game. This has important
implications for regulatory procedure. Since total transparency would detract from
government’s ability to secure valuable information, administrative law needs to balance
between the competing needs of transparency to prevent abuse and opacity to facilitate
information exchange.

Securing Truth for Power:
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policy Making

“The … power that is involved here is the power to get information from those who best
can give it and who are most interested in not doing so.”
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950)

Information is the lifeblood of regulatory policy. The effective deployment of
governmental power depends on information about conditions in the world, strategies for
improving those conditions, and the consequences associated with deploying different
strategies.1 Indeed, this need for information has led legislatures to create specialized
committee structures, delegate policy authority to expert agencies, and develop
administrative procedures that promote transparency and encourage analysis.2 Yet, legal
scholars have paid little attention to how regulators gain the information they need for

1

As Justice Breyer has written, “[t]he central problem of the standard-setting process and the most pressing

task facing many agencies is gathering the information needed to write a sensible standard.” STEPHEN
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982). See generally AARON WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO
POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS (1987).
2

KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 4-6 (1991); Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr.,

Pablo T. Spiller, & Santiago Urbiztondo, An Informational Perspective on Administrative Procedures, 15
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 283 (1999).
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making and implementing regulatory policy.3 While many information-gathering efforts
by regulatory agencies look more or less like conventional scientific analysis (as when an
environmental agency studies how pollutants travel through groundwater or a public
health agency conducts epidemiological research), much needed information will not
emerge from policy-relevant scientific research.4 In particular, regulators need
information about the operations of private business enterprises. Such information
enables regulators to understand the scope and cause of regulatory problems, and to craft
effective solutions to them.5
Government regulators are usually poorly positioned to gather information about
business operations, or at least to gather it cheaply. Often, the best source of information
about the risks of products, the behavior of individuals and firms, the costs of remediation
or mitigation, or the feasibility of different technologies will be the very firms that the

3

Legal scholars have, of course, recognized that government officials need information. See, e.g., Breyer,

supra note 1; JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 5th
ed (2003). (observing that “[s]ound decision making obviously requires good information”); Edward
Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95 (2003)
(acknowledging that “effective regulation demands large quantities of information”). However, they have
yet to analyze the strategic considerations regulators face in obtaining that information through different
means.
4

For discussion of the role of science, science policy research, and science advisors in government decision

making, see SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERS (1990).
5

See infra Part I.A.
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government agency regulates.6 While these firms have an incentive to share favorable,
self-serving information, regulators also need accurate information that private firms do
not want to disclose. How does a regulator learn about and acquire information from
parties who may suffer if they provide it?
In this article, we analyze regulators’ gathering of information from firms as a
strategic game. In Part I, we discuss the types of information that firms possess and
regulators need. We then analyze the payoffs for regulated firms in keeping this
information to themselves, arguing that silence by firms within an industry resembles the
well-known problem of collective action.7 In Parts II and III, we discuss the strategies
and tactics available to regulators to penetrate a regulated industry's silence and gather
information needed to develop effective regulation. Although regulators cannot typically
offer explicit side payments to firms to induce them to release information, they can
deploy a variety of mechanisms to try to gather information from those whom the agency
will target for regulation. Indeed, selective forms of what might be considered
“regulatory capture” by individual firms may well be desirable from the standpoint of the

6

Cary Coglianese, Litigating within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in the Regulatory Process,

30 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 735, 749-750 (1996) (“[A]gency staff members depend heavily on outside groups for
information. Effective regulation of an industry depends…on knowledge of how that industry works.
Agency staff members routinely turn to organizations in the regulated community to provide this
information.”).
7

Edward Parson, Richard Zeckhauser, & Cary Coglianese, Collective Silence and Individual Voice: The

Logic of Information Games, in JAC HECKELMAN & DENNIS COATES, EDS., COLLECTIVE CHOICE: ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF MANCUR OLSON

(2003).
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public interest in some cases, if in the process firms cede information that permits
regulators to craft more effective and efficient regulatory policies.8
In Part IV, we consider the relative virtues of the strategies and tactics discussed in
Parts II and III and theorize about conditions under which each will be appropriate.
Finally, we discuss the tensions between regulators’ need to gather information from
industry and the kinds of administrative procedures that have arisen over the past several
decades to provide legislators and others an opportunity to oversee the work of
government regulators. Many administrative procedures promote transparency in
government decision making almost as if it were an unalloyed good. Yet while
transparency serves important goals, it also inhibits some beneficial government
activities. We argue that regulators’ need to secure information from those they regulate
provides a reason for preserving some degree of opacity in some contexts in an otherwise
transparent and accountable regulatory process.

I. Industry Information and Regulatory Decision Making

The existence of information asymmetries between producers and consumers is
widely accepted as justifying certain kinds of regulatory interventions in the marketplace,
including regulation requiring firms to disclose information.9 Asymmetric information
8

9

See infra notes 98-115, 167-172 and accompanying text.
STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RECONCEIVING THE

REGULATORY STATE (1989). The use of information disclosure as a regulatory strategy has received
considerable attention. MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE: THE RISE OF TECHNOPOPULISM
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also lies at the core of the principal-agent theory that has become central to the study of
bureaucratic decision making.10 Positive analyses of regulatory policy making have
focused on the strategies that legislators -- and other governmental overseers of
administrative agencies -- use to overcome their information disadvantages vis-à-vis
regulatory officials.11 Yet while the general problem of asymmetric information

(2002); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEORGETOWN L.J. 257 (2001); Paul R. Kleindorfer &
Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155 (1998); Mary L.
Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87
MICH. L. REV. 1795 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins
and Beyond, 147 U. PENN. L. REV. 613 (1999).
10

DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS

APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999); Eric Posner, Controlling Agencies with
Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001). The
regulator (or administrative agency) is typically treated as the agent, while the legislature or executive is
treated as a principal. For a discussion of principal-agent theory, see JOHN W. PRATT & RICHARD J.
ZECKHAUSER, EDS., PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (1985).
11

Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative

Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VIRG. L. REV. 499 (1989); Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, & Barry
Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L., ECON., & ORGAN. 243
(1987); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).
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dominates the contemporary study of regulation, the asymmetries between regulators and
those they regulate has escaped sustained attention.12

12

The existence of information asymmetries between regulators and firms has certainly been recognized.

See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow and Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J.
ON REG.

1, 18 (1986) (noting that “the regulator's information is assumed to be inferior to that of the

utility's management” and that “the assumption of asymmetric information is quite plausible”); Glenn
Blackmon and Richard Zeckhauser, Fragile Commitments and the Regulatory Process, 9 YALE J. ON REG.
73, 104 (1992) (noting “the principal-agent relationship between the regulator and firm” and the firm’s
“advantage of superior information”); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain
Search for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (1999) (noting that regulators have a difficult time
assessing the costs of regulatory options “because that information is generally in the hands of the regulated
community, which has an incentive to overstate those costs”). However, virtually no attention has been
given to the strategies regulators can use to overcome their informational disadvantage and the implications
of this problem for the design of administrative law. In the relevant legal literature, we find only two
extended analytical treatments of the information asymmetry between regulators and regulated entities. See
Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 1343 (2002) (providing a game theoretic analysis of information provision
under different statutory requirements about benefit-cost analysis); Tracy Lewis and Michel Poitevin,
Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 50 (1997) (analyzing the
effect on information provision and decision making of different evidentiary standards in regulatory
proceedings). This work, like ours, recognizes the information asymmetries in making regulatory policy.
However, it differs in important respects. For example, Johnston focuses on information asymmetries with
respect to compliance costs only, whereas we recognize asymmetries in information about benefits as well.
Lewis and Poitevin consider only the context where a regulator must review an application or petition from
a regulated entity, while we analyze that context as but one of many institutional arrangements for
gathering information. More importantly, unlike these studies, we tend to view the strategic problem from
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In this first Part we consider the nature and degree of regulators’ informational
dependence on those they regulate. We begin by explaining the importance of
information in regulatory decision making, and then explain why industry usually
disproportionately possesses the information needed to craft good regulatory policy.
Most importantly, we show why an industry often has a collective interest in keeping to
itself some or all of the information government decision makers need.

A. Regulators’ Need for Information

Government regulators face the challenge of breaking industry silence by securing
information from those whose immediate interests would oppose its release. Regulators
rely on information to tailor policies that will achieve their goals, such as reducing risks.
They also need information for strategic reasons, such as to anticipate reactions by
regulated entities and to persuade other political or legal actors that their decisions are
appropriate.
Government regulation is generally required to correct for three main types of market
failures:13 lack of competition (as in cases of monopoly);14 externalities (the failure of

the perspective of the regulator, identifying strategies for government to use to play the informational game
embedded within regulatory policy making.
13

Competitive markets prove highly successful for producing and allocating society’s resources.

However, the conditions for socially optimal market transactions do not always obtain. For an overview of
the role and limits of the market, see EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY
ANALYSIS 291-308 (1978). For recent discussion of market failures, see Office of Management and
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market prices to incorporate all the costs to society of a particular form of economic
behavior);15 and a lack of full information about products and services (for prices
therefore cannot reflect the true preferences of the parties).16 For each of these three

Budget, Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations Under Executive Order 12866 (Jan. 11, 1996),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html (directing analysts to identify a
“significant market failure” justifying each proposed regulation); Office of Management and Budget,
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, A Report to the President on the Third Anniversary of
Executive Order 12866 (Dec. 1996), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html;
Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Guidelines to
Standardize Measures of Costs and Benefits and the Format of Accounting Statements (2000), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ memoranda/m00-08.pdf. But see Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., & Howard E.
McCurdy, The Failure of Market Failure, 18 J. POL. ANAL. & MGT. 558 (1999) (arguing that a superficial
focus on market failure can lead analysts to overlook the underlying causes of regulatory problems and that
attention to transaction costs offers a better approach).
14

Concentration of market power, whether through predatory behavior or a so-called “natural monopoly,”

enables firms to obtain rents by reducing supply below the levels that would arise in a fully competitive
marketplace. DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE (3d ed.
1998). Market power provides the justification for antitrust law and certain kinds of utility regulation.
15

Id. Although manufacturing firms’ count their private costs, such as capital, labor, and other inputs, they

will not count the costs that pollution from their factories impose on neighboring communities.
Environmental regulation responds to this type of market failure, seeking to alter firms’ behavior in ways
that reduce negative externalities.
16

Id. Usually sellers will know more about the efficacy and safety of their products than will buyers. In

such cases, government regulation may be needed to overcome the information asymmetries between
consumers and sellers. Labeling and product testing requirements fall into this category. See also supra
note 9.
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types of market failure, regulators need to gather information about the activities of, and
costs and benefits for, individuals and firms. They must first be able to determine when
market conditions fail to meet the ideal of a well-functioning market. Then they must
identify possible solutions and assess the consequences of different potential responses
they might take.17
To identify whether firms are acting as monopolists, regulators need information
about firms’ marginal costs of production. For utility regulation, they often need to know
whether firms are making the kind of cost-effective choices about technology or
management that they would make if the market were fully competitive.18 For social
regulation that addresses externalities or seeks to ensure adequate product disclosure or
safety, regulators need to know about the risks created by different types of products and
production processes. Thus, they need to know about the nature and magnitude of any
harmful activity or products, as well as the probability of such harm. Regulators also

17

We recognize, of course, that the regulators’ information needs will not be the same for all alternative

solutions. For example, regulators do not need the same information to restrict the quantity of an
externality (such as pollution) as they do to require the adoption of specific control technologies for, or
impose a tax on, that same externality. See, e.g., Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV.
ECON. STUD. 477 (1974); Evan Kwerel, To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution
Control, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 595 (1977); Amyaz A. Moledina et al., Dynamic Environmental Policy with
Strategic Firms: Prices versus Quantities, 45 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 356 (2003). Although the choice of
regulatory instrument will therefore affect the type and amount of information a regulator will need in any
given context, the regulator will still always need some information about regulatory problems and their
alternative solutions.
18

See Joskow and Schmalensee, supra note 12, at 16-17.
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need to understand the causes of regulatory problems. When the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration learns of a cluster of automobile accidents, it needs to find
out whether the accidents occurred due to driver errors, road conditions, or mechanical
problems. When the agency responded to blowouts in Firestone tires, for instance,
NHTSA regulators needed to understand the extent to which tire separation was caused
by factors such as heat or underinflation of tires, the tires’ poor design or production, or
the design or operation of the vehicles on which the tires were installed.19
Regulations usually specify actions that individuals or firms either must or must not
take, so regulators must know what the possible behaviors they might require or prohibit.
Particularly for problems of externalities or product hazards, regulators need to be able to
specify technological or managerial options to change present operations and reduce risk.
For example, environmental regulators need to know how oil refining, computer
manufacturing, and other industrial operations can generate less pollution. Auto safety
regulators need to understand what steps can be taken to prevent blowouts. Even when
regulations set performance standards, regulators must often know about solutions in
order to choose a feasible standard.20
19

NHTSA, Engineering Analysis Report and Initial Decision Regarding EA00-023: Firestone Wilderness

AT Tires, Oct. 4, 2001, available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/hot/Firestone/firestonesummary.html
(presenting competing analyses of the root causes of tire separation in Firestone tires); NHTSA, Proposed
Rule on Tire Standards, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,050, 10,054-56 (Mar. 5, 2002) (analyzing factors leading to tire
failure). After further study, NHTSA eventually did issue new standards for vehicle tires. NHTSA, Final
Rule on Tire Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 38,116 (June 26, 2003).
20

This is especially the case for performance standards that are explicitly based on what is achievable by

existing technologies.
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Finally, regulators need information about the probable (and actual, if known)
consequences of different courses of action.21 These consequences include the extent to
which a proposed regulation will deliver social benefits, such as enhanced safety or
public health. They also include other effects, such as compliance costs, impacts on
technological innovation, and the creation of additional harms or side effects.22 For
example, if regulators at NHTSA seek to reduce fatalities from automobile accidents and
are considering a requirement that manufacturers install air bags, they need to know more
than just how well different types of air bags will reduce overall levels of injuries or
fatalities. Price increases associated with an air bag mandate could reduce sales of new

21

See, e.g., Richard Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, MARY. L. REV. (1986) (“Formulating centralized

directives to control complex industrial and governmental subsystems involves exorbitant information and
decision making costs. Enormous amounts of data must be centrally accumulated and analyzed in order to
determine desired results and formulate the specific commands needed to achieve them.”). The practice of
benefit-cost analysis in regulatory policy making presumes that information about consequences is relevant,
even if not necessarily dispositive, in making regulatory policy. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, et al., Is There
a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221
(April 12, 1996) (defending benefit-cost analysis as “an economic tool for comparing the desirable and
undesirable impacts of proposed policies”).
22

Regulators also need information about expected compliance with different regulations, since full

compliance is rarely achieved. Cf. Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset
Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1998) (noting the tendency of budget
officials to “meet with affected parties to obtain information so that their projections will more accurately
predict taxpayer behavior”). For a regulator, information about noncompliance with existing rules may
even constitute a reason to issue new rules.
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and safer cars, or the air bags themselves might create new risks of harm, such as by
deploying at high speeds into the faces of children or smaller-than-average adults.23
Regulators depend on information for nearly everything they do.24 The pages of the
Federal Register are filled with information about regulatory problems, alternative
solutions, and their consequences. Agency dockets and the offices of agencies’ staff
members contain still more information collected in connection with rulemaking. As
Justice Breyer has observed, regulators’ demand for information is “central and endemic”
to the making of regulatory policy.25

B. Industry’s Informational Advantage

When governmental intervention is needed to protect the public from harms arising
largely independent of economic activity – such as perhaps the transmission of disease or
natural climate variability – the relevant information may be acquired by government or
independent researchers as easily as by regulatory agencies. Agencies may develop their
own in-house expertise, and may also draw upon the expertise of academic researchers,

23

24

See, e.g.,Sam Kazman, NHTSA Air Bag Mandate Misfires, REG’N. 17 (Winter 1997)
This holds true even if regulators are concerned mainly about protecting their own turf or maintaining

their budgets. After all, even parochial regulators need information about their policies in order to predict
and respond to reactions by interest groups and governmental overseers.
25

STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 112 (1982).

- 12 -

independent consultants, or even the staff of advocacy groups.26 Such expertise tends to
be general, say on the effects of air pollutants on health.
This kind of general expertise, however, is not sufficient when agencies must make
decisions about particular industry practices. Internal agency experts, and even their
outside consultants, will be at a disadvantage. Firms simply have much better access to
the up-to-date and fine-grained information needed.27
Where government contemplates regulation to protect public health or safety, those
engaging in the potentially harmful activity are likely to hold the relevant information or
be able to obtain it more readily than the government. Manufacturing firms, for instance,
almost always know much more than government about the risks associated with their
products, technologies, and processes.28 They learn through their own testing, from
reports of complaints by customers or workers, or just based on their superior
understanding of the properties of their products and processes. For example, computer
manufacturer IBM developed highly detailed in-house databases to track the chemicals
used in IBM’s production processes, the exposure of employees to these chemicals, and
26

27

BREYER, supra note 1, at 109.
David E.M. Sappington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Regulation, in ELIZABETH E. BAILEY, ED.,

PUBLIC REGULATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES 3, 6 (1987) (noting that even if
regulators do acquire information about firms’ production technologies, demand structures, and factor costs
they do so “only with a lag, and indeed, in a rapidly changing environment, the information that they
acquire may be of only limited relevance to the current situation”).
28

Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 535

(1996) (noting that firms are “more knowledgeable about the risks generated by their company’s
operations”).
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employees’ medical histories.29 Through such internal tracking systems, firms can
identify risks from their products and manufacturing processes long before government is
able to learn of them.30 It is generally accepted that tobacco companies knew about the
health risks from cigarettes decades before this information was known in governmental
and public health circles.31 Chemical firms reportedly knew about health threats from
vinyl chloride emissions long before government knew or could have known about
them.32
Firms’ informational advantage over government is usually even more pronounced
for information about alternative solutions, such as how to reduce the emissions of vinyl

29

Gerald Hillman, ECHOES: IBM’s Environmental, Chemical and Occupational Evaluation System, 24 J.

OCCUPATIONAL MED. 827 (1982); Spencer E. Ante, Was IBM Hazardous to Workers’ Health?, BUSINESS
WEEK, October 20, 2003, p. 46, 48.
30

Other major companies have implemented systems to track their impacts on occupational health and

environmental quality. See R.E. Joyner & Phil H. Pack, The Shell Oil Company’s Computerized Health
Surveillance System, 24 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 812 (1982); Maureen T. O’Berg et al., Cancer Incidence
and Mortality in the DuPont Company: An Update, 29 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 245 (1987); Cary
Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Bolstering Private-Sector Environmental Management, 17 ISSUES SCI. &
TECH. 69 (Spring 2001).
31

DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY 182

(2001); MARTHA DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN TOBACCO POLITICS
(2001).
32

Chemical Reaction, THE ECON. (March 31, 2001), available at

http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=550695.

- 14 -

chloride.33 While firms may not have the incentive to acquire information about
alternative solutions -- ignorance is a virtue if knowledge will lead to pressures to
undertake costly changes to existing practices -- these private actors will have much more
experience about how their activities might be modified to reduce or solve a problem.
For example, automobile manufacturers will know better than government the options
available for building safer cars or boosting mileage.
Most significantly, firms are better equipped to predict and identify the consequences
of different regulatory options. Obviously, firms can better project their costs of
producing goods or services under different regulatory standards. They can also better
identify other consequences. For example, they will know how long it will take to
incorporate new designs into their products and their manufacturing schedules, relevant
information in deciding the length of any phase-in period for new regulations. Firms also
generally have superior information about potential tradeoffs created by alternative rules.
For example, regulators will want to consider whether changes in the fuel economy
standards for cars will affect crash safety, something manufacturers can more easily
assess.34

33

Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to

Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOCY. REV. 691, 695 (2003) (noting that firms “possess the most
information about risks and potential control methods”).
34

For a discussion of the potential tradeoff between fuel economy and automobile safety, see NATIONAL

RESEARCH COUNCIL, EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY (CAFE)
STANDARDS 113 (2002).
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It is often impossible for government agencies to conduct independent research to
reproduce the information held by private actors. Even where possible, it is almost
always more expensive, since firms have significant advantages in cumulative
experience, technical skills, access to data, and research capacity, not to mention the fact
that they own the production process. If firms already have the needed information,
efforts by government to replicate it would be duplicative and wasteful.35

35

We recognize, of course, that not all information provided by firms will be accurate, reliable, or helpful,

and that relying exclusively and unthinkingly on the information provided by a single firm or industry can
contribute to biased regulatory decision making. See PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL
REGULATORY AGENCIES 17 (1981); Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An
Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003) (suggesting that because “agencies rely so heavily
on information about the consequences of regulatory alternatives from the very interests most affected by
regulation, who therefore know the most about those consequences, agencies over time become unwittingly
biased in favor of those they regulate”). Our claim is not that all or even most information supplied by
industry will be the most valuable information to regulators, but rather that the best and most valuable
information in many instances of regulatory policy making will be available only from industry. We are
interested in those cases where industry holds reliable and accurate information that will help a regulator
make a decision. In those cases where reliable and accurate information held by industry also supports the
interests of that industry, we can expect that industry will readily release it. The problem we are addressing
in this article is how to get valuable information from business when releasing that information does not
advance industry’s interests.
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II. The Strategy to Overcome Industry Silence

Making effective regulatory policy depends on information that is often held by
private actors, but government cannot count on self-interested holders of information to
reveal it fully and without bias.36 Neither can it count on its power to compel the
disclosure of information. Regulatory agencies can only mandate the disclosure of
information when they are so authorized by Congress,37 and for many issues they lack
such subpoena authority.38 Even when agencies do have authority, firms may resist or
evade government demands. And when firms do release the precise information
requested, they rarely generate anything more -- a distinct disadvantage when regulators
are less certain about what they need to know. Far better, for regulators, is to find a
cooperative source that will engage in give-and-take with the regulator, answering
follow-up questions, providing background details that help the regulator fit the requested
information into a larger pattern and to search for additional information when needed.
How can regulators secure information from those they regulate? In this Part, we
begin by looking at this question from the standpoint of an industry. Since regulations
affect entire industrial sectors, the release of relevant and accurate information from any

36

Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 388 (1986)

(observing that industry has incentives to keep regulatory agencies’ from receiving information they need
when setting regulatory policy).
37

See generally infra Part III.B.

38

For example, the FDA lacked general subpoena power that it could use to gather information in its

rulemaking involving the tobacco industry. DAVID KESSLER, supra note 31.

- 17 -

actor within a given sector will help the regulator, but likely harm others in the sector -as when one tobacco company or asbestos manufacturer releases information to the
government about the hazards of its products. The challenge for an industry, therefore, is
to maintain a collective silence.
The information game between regulators and industry has a complex set of payoffs
from information disclosure, and this complexity provides opportunities for government
regulators to elicit the information they need to make effective regulatory policy. As we
explain in this Part, the basic strategy is for the regulator to discover, exploit, and, if
necessary, create asymmetric interests in the release of relevant information. The
regulator must also address the risk of retribution that any disclosing party will likely face
from others within industry.

A. Industry Incentives and the Problem of Collective Silence

The provision of information to support effective public decision-making benefits
society on net.39 Yet potential targets of regulation will often lose, and therefore will
39

Karl Claxton, Bayesian Approaches to the Value of Information: Implications for the Regulation of New

Pharmaceuticals, 8 HEALTH ECON. 269, 271 (1999) (“Information is non rival and a public good.”);
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 103
(“[I]nformation is sometimes a public good. Once it is available at all, or to anyone, it may well be
available to everyone or to many people.”); William Mock, On The Centrality of Information Law: A
Rational Choice Discussion of Information Law and Transparency, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 1069, 1085 (1999) (“The cost structure of information, including the ease of reproducing it and the fact
that it is not lost to a transferor, makes most forms of information public goods.”).
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yield or withhold information strategically. Targets’ decisions to produce information,
and to reveal, bias, or conceal what they hold, will reflect their calculated attempts to
influence the knowledge and perceptions of regulators so as to promote public decisions
that either reduce their anticipated costs or increase their private benefits.40
An industry group as a whole will usually have an interest in maintaining silence, in
retaining or not even generating information that would be adverse to the interests of
private firms.41 Silence is preferred when regulators might use the information to make a
decision adverse to the industry. The more regulators learn about individual firms’

40

See ROGER G. NOLL & BRUCE M. OWEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION: INTEREST

GROUPS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS (1983) (“[I]nterest groups have an incentive to withhold
information that is inconsistent with their position and to present incomplete or biased information that
supports their views.”); Edward A. Parson, The Technology Assessment Approach to Climate Change, 18
ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 65 (2002) (“No company or industry has an interest in helping regulators to impose
burdens on them.”).
41

Our analysis also applies to the selective or biased release of information in a way favorable to

industry’s interests. However, for the sake of our analysis, we generally treat the informational decision
facing industry to be a binary one: either disclose truthfully and fully, or not at all. We recognize that such
a simplification abstracts away much of the subtleties in information transmission, leaving to the side
selective transmission, signposting, framing, and spinning, and all sorts of important questions about
interpretation. Richard Zeckhauser & David V.P. Marks, Signposting: the Selective Revelation of Product
Information, in RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, RALPH L. KEENEY, & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, EDS. WISE CHOICES:
DECISIONS, GAMES, AND NEGOTIATIONS (1996). We make this simplifying assumption here because our
main purpose here is to bring clarity to the structure of incentives facing industry and the strategies
available to government to identify and respond to those incentives.
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technological capabilities, the more able they will be, all things being equal, to design
and justify more stringent requirements later.
Once someone releases information to the regulator, it usually cannot be retracted,42
and it usually leads to consequences that extend beyond the discloser. Thus all the firms
within a relevant sector will have a collective interest in everyone’s maintaining silence.
When no firm’s benefits from revealing information outweigh its benefits from silence,
there is no conflict between individual and collective interests; silence will prevail. But
when firms’ individual interests to reveal conflict with the industry’s collective interest in
silence, maintaining silence effectively becomes a problem of collective action.43 The
collective action problem arises when there exists some good that all members of a group
can share, but when each group member has an incentive to “free ride,” i.e., let the others
work to produce the collective good. For example, all citizens can enjoy the benefits of a
cleaner environment, but each individual’s share of these benefits is usually far smaller
than the cost to any single individual to lobby successfully for new environmental
42

Otto Keck, The Information Dilemma: Private Information as a Cause of Transaction Failure in

Markets, Regulation, Hierarchy, and Politics, 31 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 139, 152 (1987) (noting that
“exchange of information is irreversible”). Disclosure by one actor may, of course, be disputed or
contradicted by others. In some cases, the release of information by one actor may be insufficient to meet
the regulator’s needs, and still more information is needed from others. We discuss the implications of the
order of disclosure infra at Part II.C.
43

The quintessential collective action problem is getting individuals to make voluntary contributions to a

common purpose, such as supporting a museum or a professional organization. For a discussion of the
problem of collective action, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965);

RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982).
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regulations. Since individuals will be able to enjoy a cleaner environment regardless of
whether they participated in any collective lobbying effort, each individual will have an
incentive to free ride on the activities of others. The collective action that is optimal
action for the group does not arise spontaneously.
A comparable tension between collective and individual interest exists with
information. Each firm in the sector benefits from silence, but only if all firms do not
disclose information to the regulator. Thus, industry faces a problem of “collective
inaction” – to maintain silence.44
The immediate costs of concealing information are usually trivial, since silence
typically requires taking no action at all; instead, the collective inaction challenge
becomes severe when the consequences of regulatory decisions based on information
released differ across firms.45 Some firms might not be harmed. Some firms may even
benefit from disclosure (at least relative to their competitors). For example, if
competitors differ in the costs of controlling a certain type of risk, it may be beneficial for
a low-cost firm to disclose information about the risk to the regulator.

44

45

Parson, Zeckhauser, & Coglianese, supra note 7.
More precisely, these differences are ones of expected consequences. The expected value of silence and

disclosure for any individual firm will reflect its predictions about the consequences of the action a
regulator will likely take if certain information were to be disclosed. These predictions will be based on
judgments about the behavior of the regulator, the degree of confidence the regulator will have in the
information, and the responses of other group members to the disclosure of that information.
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B. The Information Game
The real world game among industry participants can best be understood with the aid
of a game theory matrix. We illustrate for just two firms, but the lessons readily extend
to cases with many. Each of the firms prefers the outcome where both Maintain Silence.
If the game is fully symmetric, and the regulator intervenes no further, this outcome can
be expected.
Firm A
Reveal Industry
Maintain Silence
Information
Maintain
Silence

10,10

0,8

Reveal
Industry
Information

8,0

6,6

Firm B

In this situation, Firm A would reason as follows: “If Firm B is going to Reveal, I should
as well. But if B Maintains Silence, I also want to Maintain Silence. However, B is
insightful, and will see that the both Maintain Silence equilibrium is preferable for both
of us than both Reveal. Thus, I will Maintain Silence.” Firm A will reason equivalently,
and silence will be maintained.
We have presented the information game using illustrative payoff structures but the
expected payoffs from silence and disclosure of particular pieces of information will
often vary from firm to firm. Even if firms always made the same predictions about a
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regulator’s actions (and they do not), those actions will affect different firms differently.
Regulation can sometimes benefit certain firms, for example by raising barriers to entry
by competitors.46 Firms that specialize in developing risk-reduction technologies will
have interests that differ from firms that might be required to buy these technologies.
Even among comparable firms in the same sector, there will be differences in the
capacity and cost of each firm to respond to new regulations. If overall demand for a
product is fairly inelastic, an increase in one firm’s costs by, say, $10 per unit may be
worthwhile for that firm if it simultaneously increases competitors’ costs by $20 per unit.
Firms that are already leaders in their sectors in health, safety, or environmental
protection will likely not be so affected by new regulations as so-called laggard firms.47
Firms that discover more benign industrial practices may believe they could reap a
competitive advantage by revealing what they have learned to the regulator and
encouraging the promulgation of new rules that will differentially burden their
competitors.
In this situation, the game theory matrix will no longer be symmetric. Let us say that
firm A is the one that gains by revealing information, particularly if B does not. The
matrix might be as follows:

46

See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. SCI. 3, 3-6

(1971).
47

See NEIL GUNNINGHAM & DARREN SINCLAIR, LEADERS AND LAGGARDS: NEXT GENERATION

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (2002).
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Firm A
Maintain Silence

Reveal Now

Reveal if Firm B
Reveals

10,10

0,14

Not applicable

8,0

6,6

7,4

Not applicable

4,12

Not applicable

Maintain
Silence

Firm B Reveal Now

Reveal if
Firm A
Reveals

In this game, Firm A will Reveal Now, since this is its preferred strategy no matter what
B does. Firm B, anticipating this, will also Reveal Now, so as to receive 6 rather than 4
or 0. Note the danger if firms do not know their counterpart’s type. It may be that both
firms have the payoffs of Firm B, but if they are sufficiently worried that the other firm
may have payoffs like A, or indeed that the other firm may think that it has payoffs like A
(even though they are like B), then the other firm will Reveal Now. Thus, the worrying
firm should also Reveal Now. Thus, if there is sufficient uncertainty about payoffs, the
situation may have a stable equilibrium where both Maintain Silence, but one or both
parties may Reveal Now.
Regulators can themselves take action to affect firms’ interests in disclosure. This
strategy is well known in criminal law, where prosecutors cut deals with low-level
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employees or bit players in conspiracies if they share information. Thus, regulators try to
turn Figure 1 situations into a Prisoners’ Dilemmas, where both firms have an incentive
to Reveal, although both would be better off if they both Maintained Silence. The
regulator will also work to create less extreme situations, like the one illustrated in Figure
2. Identifying and working on the firms that have the greatest incentive to break silence,
or agreeing to reward the first firm that breaks silence are strategies that help in this
creation. It may also just be helpful to wander among firms searching for information,
with vague hints that cooperators will get some reward. Each firm will worry that some
other firm has an incentive to bolt the Maintain Silence equilibrium. When its worry gets
large, that gives a firm an incentive to bolt first.
In Part III, we discuss the various ways that regulators can reward or punish
individual firms based on whether they disclose information.48 Asymmetrical interests
may also arise out of different beliefs about the likelihood that silence will successfully
stave off new regulation. If it appears that a regulator intends to issue a regulation even
in the absence of certain information, some firms may prefer to be perceived as “good
citizens” and to release information in an attempt to shape the details of the new
regulation.
Finally, firms are made up of individual people whose interests may vary. The
individual employees or managers who make up a firm are the people who actually
collect, analyze, and store information that may be of value to a regulator. Their interests

48

See infra Part III.
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will not, of course, always be fully aligned with the firm’s overall interests;49 personal
payoffs may differ from the payoffs to their firm. Individuals may not care about the
benefits that silence brings to the firm as an organization, and they may sometimes find
that cooperating with a regulator brings them personal benefits, such as by making it
easier in the future for them to interact with the regulator on other matters related to their
jobs.
In sum, payoffs to firms or individuals can depart from the industry’s collective
payoff from preserving silence in three ways. First, payoffs may differ among firms. Not
all firms will oppose the revelation of specific information to the same extent, and some
might even gain a comparative advantage from the resulting regulation. Second,
regulators may seek to manipulate firms’ payoffs for disclosure. Third, employees’
interests may diverge from those of their firms.
As a result, an industry as a whole faces a challenge in maintaining collective silence.
An industry needs to be able to threaten retribution on those who squeal. Retribution can
range from various social sanctions inflicted against the managers of a squealing firm
(e.g., yelling at them on the phone or withdrawing invitations to social events), to kicking
the firm out of the industry trade association, to leaking information uniquely damaging
to the squealing firm. (Why would firms disclose information adverse to a competitor
only as retribution, instead of disclosing it preemptively? The reason is simple. If a firm
did not hold back, it would then be the squealing firm and would itself be subject to
retribution.) The risk of retribution is clearest for employees who disclose information
49

JOHN W. PRATT & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, EDS., PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF

BUSINESS 4 (1985).
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adverse to their employers: they lose their current job, and can expect difficulty finding
employment elsewhere in the industry.50 Thus, the threat of retribution helps reinforce
silence within an industry. Of course, when firms or individuals can disclose information
to a regulator without it being known to others that they are disclosing, they can reduce
the risk of retribution. For this reason, as we will see, there exists a heretofore
unappreciated value to secrecy in the regulatory process.

C. Informational Strategy for Regulators

Regulators face two distinct scenarios in the disclosure of information. In the first,
the interests within an industry are asymmetric, and the industry faces a challenge in
maintaining collective silence. That is, some firms (or individuals) would expect to
benefit from exposing certain information to the regulator; others would expect to lose.
The regulator will seek to exploit these asymmetries and try to secure information from
those who would expect to gain. In the second scenario, all firms’ natural incentives are
to maintain collective silence. The regulator will need to create new incentives, by
offering rewards or punishments (or both) for the release of relevant and accurate
information. In this section, we explain the payoffs underlying these two scenarios and
develop general strategic considerations government regulators face in overcoming
expected industry silence.
1. Exploit Asymmetries of Interests. Asymmetries of interest arise across different
firms when firms face (or perceive that they face) different levels of harm from the
50

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 6 (2003).
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disclosure of certain information. For example, in the 1970s, aerosol product firms tried
to maintain a unified opposition to a ban on chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) propellants. As
consumer resistance to aerosol products emerged, however, the S.C. Johnson Wax
Company broke ranks and announced that it would remove all CFC propellants from its
products. S.C. Johnson could take this position because it had developed water-based
propellants twenty years earlier and used CFCs in only a small fraction of its aerosol
products.51 The subsequent ban on CFC propellants was much less adverse to Johnson’s
interests as it was to other companies’ interests, and could actually offer it some
competitive advantage, at least in the short term.
To exploit asymmetries, regulators try to find the firms that are equivalent to the
Johnson Wax Company. Since firms differ in the extent to which their business depends
on a technology or practice of concern to regulators, perhaps because they have a
substitute, regulators can try to elicit information from the firms likely to be affected least
by a new regulation, but that still possess information that can be generalized across the
industry. Firms that have already invested in strategies with lesser social impacts may
actually prefer to disclose information that will promote regulation, or at least may be
less opposed to its release. For example, prior to issuing a recent notice of proposed
rulemaking on dietary supplements, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) engaged in
various public outreach and information-gathering efforts. The larger manufacturers
shared information because they hoped that FDA’s rulemaking “would establish a level
playing field for industry, which would help prevent irresponsible firms from making and

51

L. DOTTO AND H. SCHIFF, THE OZONE WAR (1978).
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selling adulterated products.”52 Firms at the forefront of their fields may even cultivate
relationships with regulators, so that they can pass along information about innovative
practices that regulators might make obligatory.
There are many differences beyond those between so-called “leaders and laggards.”53
Older firms may have interests that differ from newer firms. Suppliers’ interests can
differ from those of manufacturers. Firms selling to regional or niche markets may differ
from firms selling to a broad, national market. Differences in firms’ cost structures,
technologies, and comparative abilities will affect attitudes toward disclosing information
to regulators.
Firms also differ in the degree to which they are regulated. Some firms are affected
by an entire series of regulations issued by a government agency, while other firms are
affected by only a few of the agency’s rules. Firms that interact with a regulatory agency
on an ongoing basis will have a stronger interest in open and accurate disclosure of
otherwise adverse information on a particular issue than firms that rarely interact with the
agency; the former have more need to maintain their credibility with the regulator.
Regulators can also exploit asymmetries inside firms, by seeking information from
employees, the so-called whistleblowers. Sometimes regulators receive employee
52

FDA, Proposed Rule on Dietary Supplements, 68 Fed. Reg. 12,158 (Mar. 13, 2003).
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Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 262 (1998) (observing based on a study of HUD
regulations that “businesses did not present a united front”); David M. Hart, Business Is Not an Interest
Group (And, By the Way, There’s No Such Thing as “Business”): On the Study of Companies in American
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information passively. For example, New York’s attorney general, Eliot Spitzer,
received a tip from a whistleblower in 2003 that suggested illegal market-timing and
after-hours trading within the mutual fund industry. This prompted further investigation
by the Securities and Exchange Commission and led to new regulations of the industry.54
Regulators often do not wait for employee revealers to step forward. For example, in
the Food and Drug Administration’s tobacco rulemaking in the 1990s, Commissioner
David Kessler admitted that he “badly needed industry informants who could help [him]
piece together the bits of information … and make sense of it all.”55 He directed his staff
to track down current and former employees who might possess information to help the
FDA build its case against tobacco. One informant the agency located “confirmed that
the technology existed to make tobacco that was free of nicotine,” a fact that the tobacco
industry had undoubtedly tried to suppress.56
When exploiting potential asymmetries across or within firms, regulators must protect
their sources from retribution. To this end, they treat sources confidentially. For
National Politics, Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper No. RWP02-032 (2002) (arguing that
on many policy issues there are no common positions for all businesses).
54
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example, after providing assurances of confidentiality, FDA investigators did little more
than appeal to civic duty to convince most tobacco informants to reveal information
adverse to the their current or former employers.57 Regulatory agencies commonly
provide protections for confidential business information, which allows firms to provide
information without competitors’ knowing what they revealed.58 Of course, it is also
important that the regulator avoid using the information in a way that would hint at its
underlying source. Double sourcing – revealing only when other confirmatory
information has been obtained through other means – offers such protection.59
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KESSLER, supra note 31, at 81, 83, 235.
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The Freedom of Information Act exempts agencies from disclosing “trade secrets and commercial or

financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(4). In
addition, the Trade Secrets Act provides additional protection for certain confidential business information.
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protection of confidentiality will be even more critical when government is seeking information voluntarily
by exploiting asymmetries of interests, given the potential competitive or retributive consequences if the
revealer is found out. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized the need to protect the
confidentiality of business information precisely to encourage continued cooperation by industry in
informing government decision makers. Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
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submitted to the government. Id.
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Regulators may also offer to protect whistleblowers against reprisals from their
employers. For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued regulations
that prohibit nuclear facilities from firing, reducing the salary, or otherwise
discriminating against employees who report violations to the NRC.60 It has also issued
rules that prohibit employers from including “no-talk” provisions in agreements settling
employment discrimination disputes, finding that such restrictions can “have a chilling
effect on communications about nuclear safety, security, or other matters, and would
restrict, impede, or frustrate full and candid disclosure to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission about matters of regulatory significance.”61
2. Create Incentives. When regulators cannot identify sources that might reveal, or
suspect there are none, they are in the second scenario. The regulators must create new
incentives to break industry’s silence, i.e., to get firms to disclose information.62

has now done for many financial institutions in the mutual fund business. We discuss the relationship
between the different strategies further in Part II.A.3.
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Regulators can issue information requests under a threat of some penalty. For
example, when the SEC in 2003 ordered mutual funds to turn over information related to
possible market timing and after-hours trading activity, its request detailed the civil
penalties for noncompliance.63 Even a “voluntary” request for information may carry an
implicit risk that failure to demonstrate good faith compliance might subject the firm to a
closer and more extensive investigation by the regulator.
Regulators can also reward firms that come forward with needed information. In
crafting a new regulation, it is sometimes possible to design a rule, or mode of
enforcement, to vary the burden imposed on particular industries or firms, effectively
(though not explicitly) giving favorable treatment to firms that provide information. As
we discuss further in Part III, some regulatory agencies have even established recognition
programs that try to reward firms that act responsibly and are willing to engage in
information sharing with the agency.
Beyond creating incentives for individual firms, regulators can use their regulatory
authority to shape overall industry incentives. If the government can credibly signal that
it will issue a new regulation whether or not it receives certain information from the
industry, firms may choose to disclose otherwise adverse facts in the hope of forestalling
an even more stringent or costly regulation. Firms may also find some value from acting
like a “good citizen” if they think the regulator already has enough information to create
a regulation that will withstand judicial scrutiny. Regulators, like shrewd prosecutors
trying to break down conspirators, may feign more knowledge than they have.
63
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Finally, industry’s response to new regulations can give regulators information
needed to tighten or refine these regulations still further. For example, the Montreal
Protocol required a 50 percent reduction in industry’s use of CFCs and established a
technology assessment panel to identify ways to meet this target.64 Since the entire
industry now faced incentives for finding ways of reducing their use of CFCs,
participation on the assessment panel provided an opportunity for firms to pool their
expertise to achieve innovations.65 The results included new information that proved
helpful to industry and yielded positive externalities: the collective search led to the use
of less harmful chemicals and new technological processes that reduced the use of ozonedepleting chemicals by more than 95 percent.66

D. Additional Strategic Considerations.

Our analysis of regulators’ basic strategies raises three implications. First, effective
regulatory decision making depends on more than just scientific, economic, and
engineering information. It also requires political information, that is, information about
the interests and proclivities of affected firms and individuals. Regulators must
understand the various interests at stake if they are going to try to exploit asymmetric
interests, even when using rewards or punishments. How do regulators find out about
64
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firms’ interests in disclosure? Often information about interests comes from ongoing
interactions between regulators and the industries they regulate. Regulators may also
issue advance notices of proposed rulemaking to flush out interests. In a preplay to the
main round of the game, the nature and intensity of firms’ responses to regulators’ initial
forays reveals information about their underlying interests.67
Second, regulators will usually both exploit asymmetries and provide incentives that
create them. They may use both strategies in tandem, such as by issuing an information
request backed up by penalties and also separately (but discretely) targeting individual
firms with differential interests to obtain other information. Or they may combine the
two strategies into one effort, such as by rewarding those firms already most inclined to
disclose. They may also stage the two strategies when searching for the same
information. Regulators who exploit asymmetries can later try to create incentives.
Regulatory problems often have several plausible causes, and they almost always
have several potential solutions. The value of any particular piece of information for the
regulator depends on how effectively it fills a gap in the regulator’s knowledge base and
how important that gap is to the regulator’s overall decision making. For firms, the costs
and benefits of providing any given piece of information also vary, depending upon the
likely consequences of disclosure. The regulator will thus wish to downplay the
significance of any information it seeks from a potential source, and to pursue different
pieces of information from different actors, so that it will be harder for any one of them to

67
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see how the pieces fit together.68 In this way, regulators are not unlike the police
investigating a crime. They go around asking many people for small bits of information
and then attempt to piece it all together.
Firms with a hazy picture of the regulator’s overall puzzle will be less likely to assess
accurately the value and impact of the release of any particular piece of information.69
Some firms will overestimate the value of their information to the regulator and will
therefore resist disclosure; others will underestimate the regulator’s use of what they say,
and will release more information than they otherwise would. For example, in building
its case for tobacco regulation, FDA investigators interviewed tobacco farmers about
some of the experimental crops they grew in an effort to show how the industry had
developed techniques to control the levels of nicotine in cigarettes.70 Undoubtedly, few
farmers who talked to agency investigators fully appreciated how the FDA would use
information about their crops to build a case against the tobacco industry. And surely no
experienced government investigator would have conveyed to these farmers that the fate
of the tobacco industry rested in the information they were being asked to provide.
68
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A third consideration emerging from our strategic analysis is that regulators need to
consider in what order they will pursue different sources of information.71 Regulators
will want to distinguish between sources of information according to how valuable their
information is. It may be better for regulators first to pursue information from sources
possessing lower information value, building up their base of knowledge so that they can
later maximize what they learn from their most intelligent sources of information. Of
course, since regulators often do not know what they are hunting for, they may not know
which sources will be most valuable ones until well into an inquiry.
As a general guideline, regulators should try to exploit asymmetries before attempting
to create incentives. A regulator’s initial step in any regulatory proceeding should be to
determine which firms (or individuals) are likely to have asymmetric interests with
respect to different pieces of relevant information.72 It may take time to find a willing
source of information, but if the agency can afford the delay this is generally preferable to
mandating disclosure, which sets up an adversarial posture that can be difficult or
impossible to unwind.73 But when regulators believe that there is a low probability of
finding any cooperative source or if the problem is particularly urgent, it may be better to

71
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will also likely vary depending on the order of revelation. Whether by regulators or by industry, the
strongest incentives – positive or negative – may be applied to those firms who disclose (or threaten to
disclose) first. See Parson, Zeckhauser, & Coglianese, supra note 7.
72

See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.

73

See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
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use their subpoena power at the outset.74 Mandatory disclosure may also be more
appropriate when regulators are looking for confirmation of something they already
know.

III. Regulators’ Tactics for Eliciting Information

In this Part, we consider the specific tactics that regulators use to exploit asymmetries
of interest and to create new incentives for disclosure. Legal commentators generally
distinguish between forms of voluntary disclosure of information and compulsory
disclosure,75 and pay more attention to compulsory inspections and subpoenas, which

74

There may also be strategic reasons for regulators to issue subpoenas before exploring other options,

regardless of the relative merits of mandated disclosure in terms of collecting valuable information. Issuing
a subpoena conveys to Congress and the public an impression that the regulator is taking swift action to
address a problem and it also tends to put the firms that are subject to a subpoena in a bad light, which may
distract attention from criticisms of the regulator. Agencies do publicize their issuance of administrative
subpoenas, behavior that confirms the strategic value to mandated disclosure entirely apart from its value
for securing information. For recent accounts of regulators’ high-profile probes into practices in the mutual
fund industry, see Scott Bernard Nelson, US, State Broaden Inquiry of Funds: More Firms Get Notes
Seeking Information, The Boston Globe, Sept. 6, 2003, at C1; Ellen Kelleher, US Extends Probe to Include
Intermediaries, Financial Times, Oct. 13, 2003, at 27; Adrian Michaels, SEC Puts Pressure on Mutuals,
Financial Times, Oct. 30, 2003, at 16.
75

RICHARD J. PIERCE, I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 194 (4th ed, 2002) (“[A]lmost all the information

the agencies receive from private parties comes in voluntarily. In both adjudication and rulemaking,
whether formal or informal, private parties voluntarily submit the facts about themselves, and they usually
answer questionnaires without compulsion.”); JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL, AND PETER M.
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raise issues about privacy and protections against self-incrimination.76 Yet the tactics
available to regulators are actually quite diverse: (a) disclosure as a precondition for
regulatory decisions; (b) mandatory reporting and access; (c) rewards for disclosure; (d)
nonmandatory information requests; (e) formal interaction; and (f) informal interaction.

A. Conditioning Decisions on Disclosure
Regulators sometimes condition key decisions on the disclosure of information by
regulated firms.77 For example, companies must submit extensive information to the
FDA to secure its approval to market new drugs.78 The Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) requires manufacturers of new aircraft to submit extensive test results before the

SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 5th ed (2003) (“Agencies obtain
needed information in a variety of ways. Most of it is provided voluntarily….However, some information
that government officials require to develop policy…is not willingly disclosed.”).
76

See, e.g., Carlos B. Castillo, Discord Among Federal Courts of Appeals: The Constitutionality of

Warrantless Searches of Employers' OSHA Records, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 201 (1990); Susan M.
McDonough, The Fourth Power? Administrative Searches vs. The Fourth Amendment, 20 N.E. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CON. 195 (1993); Geoffrey G. Hemphill, The Administrative Search Doctrine: Isn't This Exactly
What the Framers Were Trying to Avoid?, 5 REGENT U. L. REV. 215, 217 (1995).
77

The Office of Management and Budget estimates that 39.7% of all authorized information collection

requests are “required to obtain or retain some kind of benefit.” OMB, Final Report of the Small Business
Paperwork Relief Task Force 7 (June 27, 2003).
78

Pharmaceutical firms must file new drug applications that include all the data and findings from any

clinical trial performed on a drug they would like to market. 21 U.S.C. § 355. If the agency finds that the
data show that the drug meets the requirements for safety and efficacy, it will approve the drug for market.
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agency will certify the design as meeting applicable safety standards.79 While such
transfers of information take place in case-by- case proceedings instead of general policy
making, the information about the industry the agency gains may prove helpful in
subsequent rulemakings by the agency or by other agencies.
Firms have incentives to submit selective, biased, or even false information to satisfy
disclosure requirements.80 For example, in its application to market a drug called
Oraflex, the pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly failed to disclose overseas deaths
associated with the use of Oraflex.81 By the time the company pleaded guilty and was

79

See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended in sections of

14, 15, 16, 31, 40, 48, and 49 U.S.C.). 14 C.F.R. § 21.33(b) (manufacturer must make all inspections and
tests); 14 C.F.R. § 21.35(b) (manufacturer must make all flight tests). See generally Mark A. Valetti,
Comment, Preemption of State Law Tort Claims in the Context of Aircraft Manufacturers, 60 J. AIR L. AND
COM. 699, 705-710 (Dec. 1994/Jan. 1995) (describing the FAA certification process). In addition, the
manufacturer must demonstrate that it has in place a quality control system to ensure that its production
process will consistently produce aircraft that meet the approved design. See 14 C.F.R. § 21.139; 14 C.F.R.
§ 21.143 (noting what data must be provided to demonstrate quality control); 14 C.F.R. § 21.135
(certification will be issued if application meets requirements of § 21.139 and 21.143). These detailed
plans describe the processes manufacturers use to meet safety requirements, providing information about
each firms’ production.
80

These incentives will be affected by the penalties for submitting inaccurate or incomplete information

and the probabilities of getting caught.
81

See Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41

VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1148 n.124 (1993). See also Morton Mintz, Indictment Accuses Drug-Testing Firm
of Falsifying Results, THE WASHINGTON POST, Jun. 1, 1979, at A9 (describing allegations of falsification
by another drug company).
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forced to withdraw the drug from the market, the drug reportedly had caused about 50
deaths in the United States.82
Regulators usually cannot independently verify the information firms provide, and
often it is hard to detect subtle inaccuracies in the data or the firms’ analysis.
Overcoming this problem requires large penalties for false disclosure or ones that apply
to individual decision makers directly.83 Congress took this approach in the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, which increased penalties for corporate fraud and required individual
certification by CEOs of the accuracy of company filings.84
At times, regulators can use information from firms’ applications submitted to other
agencies. For example, to understand the tobacco industry’s techniques, the FDA relied
on information submitted to the Patent Office in support of tobacco companies’ patent
applications. Tobacco companies touted their innovative methods of controlling nicotine
levels when applying for patents related to cigarette manufacturing; this information later
helped the FDA build its case that cigarettes were sophisticated drug delivery devices that
warranted the FDA’s regulatory control.85
82

See Teresa Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1335, 1348

(1993).
83

See Sidney Shapiro, Divorcing Profit Motivation From New Drug Research: A Consideration of

Proposals to Provide the FDA with Reliable Test Data, 1978 DUKE L.J. 155, 170 (1978) (questioning the
ability of FDA officials to detect subtle biases in the data they receive); Schwartz, supra note 82, at 115758.
84

85

Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002).
KESSLER, supra note 31, at 122-24 (evidence from patent applications showed that industry had

developed the means of manipulating nicotine levels in cigarettes). Of course, FDA’s efforts to regulate
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B. Mandatory Reporting and Access

Regulators can mandate that firms release information or submit to government audits
or inspections, with the threat of penalties if firms do not comply.86 Mandated
information disclosure can take the form of subpoenas, reporting requirements, and
government inspections of facilities.
It is well established that Congress and the courts have the authority to order the
disclosure of information.87 Regulatory agencies can also compel businesses or
individuals to answer questions or produce documents, as long as Congress has given
them this authority by statute and they request information that is relevant to a legitimate

tobacco ultimately were not sustained in court, as the U.S. Supreme Court held that tobacco products were
specifically excluded by statute from FDA’s jurisdiction. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
120 S.Ct. 1291 (2000).
86

The Office of Management and Budget estimates that 38.4% of all authorized information collection

requests “are mandatory where failure to provide the information required can result in civil, or criminal,
sanctions.” OMB, supra note 77, at 7.
87

Congress has the power to compel witnesses to testify or produce documents so that it can more

competently exercise its legislative authority. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). See generally
John M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L.REV.
153, 189 (1926). Courts can compel the disclosure of information in litigation, which on occasion will
prove to be an additional source of information for regulators. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17; Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, 45.
The litigation filed by smokers and state attorney generals yielded documents helpful to the FDA in its
rulemaking on cigarettes. KESSLER, supra note 31.
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agency purpose and is not patently unreasonable.88 The courts allow agencies granted
such authority to use it to obtain information for rulemaking as well as enforcement.89
Courts have generally deferred to regulators when it comes to enforcing information
requests, even upholding broad requests for “all papers” or “all documents” related to
issues of concern to the regulator.90 Indeed, the courts have held that mere “official
curiosity” is a sufficient purpose for mandatory information requests, provided the
information requested pertains to a matter within the agency’s authority.91
Regulators can also compel firms to file routine reports that effectively enable
government to monitor relevant aspects of an industry. For example, under the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requires

88

U.S. v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 654; Endicott Johnson v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943) (agency

orders will be sustained unless “plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any legal purpose” of the agency). For
example, the Federal Trade Commission has the authority “to require by subpoena the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and the production of all such documentary evidence relating to any matter under
investigation.” 15 U.S.C. § 49. However, even when statutes contain authorizations to conduct physical
inspections of facilities, the Supreme Court has held that in certain situations regulators may be required to
obtain search warrants prior to making an inspection in the absence of a firm’s consent. Marshall v.
Barlow’s, 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
89

FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, 595 F.2d 685, 702.

90

Id. at 703 (“When the inquiry is conducted pursuant to a lawful purpose and the request is relevant to that

objective, its reasonableness will be presumed absent a showing that compliance threatens to disrupt or
unduly hinder the normal operations of a business.”). See also Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, Phillips
Petroleum v. Lujan, 951 F.2d 257, 260, (10th Cir. 1991).
91

Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652.
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companies to disclose scientific studies they have conducted on toxic substances92 and to
report data on production levels of chemicals listed on the agency’s Chemical Substances
Inventory.93 The EPA uses such data to help set priorities, assess new risks, and establish
and implement agency regulations.94 Firms that fail to report the required information
may face court-ordered fines of up to $25,000 per day for each violation.
Mandatory reporting does have the advantage that it may overcome selection bias, as
voluntary disclosure is more likely to elicit information from a unrepresentative sample
of firms, namely those with favorable information to reveal.95 Unfortunately, such
mandatory extractions suffer three shortcomings. First, requests for information can be
politically unpopular, particularly if they require a lot of effort by the industry to respond
to them. To limit government information requests, for example, Congress has adopted
the Paperwork Reduction Act, which requires agencies to obtain approval from OMB for

92

Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(d); 40 C.F.R. § 716.

93

See 15 U.S.C. § 2607; Partial Updating of TSCA Inventory Data Base; Production and Site Reports, 51

Fed. Reg. 21,438 (Jun. 12, 1986).
94

Partial Updating of TSCA Inventory Data Base; Production and Site Reports, 50 Fed. Reg. 9944

(proposed Mar. 12, 1985) (stating that EPA uses the information it receives to “set priorities for further
investigation, … to estimate, along with other data, the potential for human and environmental exposure to
specific substances, to support the implementation of various TSCA regulations, and to perform economic
impact analyses for potential TSCA regulations”).
95

For an analogous scenario in the regulation of disclosure of information to consumers, see Howard

Beales, Richard Craswell, and Steven Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Regulation, 24 J. L. &
ECON. 491, 537 (1981) (noting that when disclosure is voluntary “information will usually be disclosed
only by sellers of whom it speaks well”).

- 44 -

any information requests that ask identical questions of more than ten individuals or
companies.96 Second, to be effective, mandatory information requests require that the
regulator already has enough information to know what issues to ask about. Firms are
unlikely to respond to a subpoena by volunteering information beyond what is required.
Third, it is generally hard for government to determine whether firms have provided
complete responses. A failure to make any response will be clear, but it is extremely
difficult to demonstrate omission or evasion if the firm responds with at least some
information. A recent amnesty program administered by the EPA under TSCA shows the
nondisclosure problem can be extensive. The EPA established a five-year amnesty
period, waiving penalties for firms that came forward with studies on toxic substances
they had previously failed to disclose.97 Companies disclosed 11,000 old studies that had
previously gone undisclosed.98

C. Rewards for Disclosure

The EPA’s amnesty program was actually an example of a reward for disclosure.
Through this program, the EPA offered firms something of value – namely, amnesty – in
96

44 U.S.C. § 3502(3).

97

See Marianne Lavelle, EPA’s Amnesty Has Become a Mixed Blessing: Be Careful What You Ask For,

NAT. L.J., Feb. 24, 1997, at A1.
98

Id. Some companies claimed that they had failed to submit the older studies because of ambiguity about

whether they were required to do so, not out of any obstructionist intent. A similar amnesty program for
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exchange for information. Regulators’ rewards are often much more discreet. For
example, regulators may become valued and trusted sources of information about agency
activities for industry representatives who are valued and trusted sources of information
for regulators.
Although difficult to document, it is plausible that regulators sometimes design rules
that subtly reward firms that provide information.99 In negotiations over multi-state
tobacco litigation, for example, the Liggett Group sought special treatment in part
because the company had previously reached a deal releasing documents that revealed the
tobacco industry’s efforts to cover up smoking’s hazards.100

production data for chemicals listed on EPA’s inventory apparently netted new information from about 250
companies. Id.
99

For example, government could adopt a technology-based standard that locks in a technology that the

firm already uses would put competitors at a disadvantage, whereas a performance-based standard might
not.
100

Tobacco’s Crumbling Barricades, NEW YORK TIMES, March 22, 1997, p. 22. Liggett also claimed it

could not afford its share of the settlement. CARRICK MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO
224 (1998). In the end, however, Liggett was unable to secure an exemption from the terms of the
settlement, in large part because the rest of the industry closed ranks. Id. at 224, 233. Although this is an
example of information disclosure in litigation, for an argument that large-scale litigation over social issues
such as tobacco has effectively become a form of regulation, see W. KIP VISCUSI, ED., REGULATION
THROUGH LITIGATION (2002).
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Over an extended time, many opportunities will arise for regulators to offer implicit
benefits to firms that release relevant and accurate information.101 In repeated
interaction, especially when information is the currency of exchange, building a
reputation matters since a regulator needs to be able to trust the information provided to it
by an industry source. By providing information adverse to its interests, at least once in a
while, a firm can bolster its credibility as an industry source, making it more likely that
the government will grant the firm some implicit benefit -- if only by believing the firm
even when other information it shares seems self-serving. This is especially relevant for
information about industry costs or technological feasibility.
Regulators have also developed programs that deliver explicit inducements to
firms if they deliver helpful information to the government. These programs, which are
often justified as efforts to reward firms for achieving outcomes superior to what is
normally required, also allow regulators to learn about best practices. For example, in the
area of environmental and occupational safety regulation, agencies now offer explicit
benefits to encourage firms to participate in various pilot projects or reveal information
about their management practices. Firms that commit to taking on extra measures and
are willing to provide the government with more information about their products or

101

Given that many firms and trade associations are engaged in long term, repeated interaction with

regulatory officials, they will find benefits over the long term from cooperative and open dealing with
government. ROBERT AXELROD, EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); Coglianese, supra note 6.
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practices than is normally required receive special recognition, reduced enforcement
scrutiny, and in sometimes outright exemptions from existing standards.102
For example, after receiving a series of health complaints from neighbors of large
animal feedlot operations, the EPA began investigating whether it should take regulatory
action to address the situation. To collect information, the EPA initiated negotiations
with firms to induce them to implement monitoring systems on their facilities to provide
EPA with data on the pollutants in the air at feedlots.103 In exchange for firms’
willingness to install monitoring devices, the EPA reportedly offered to “give farm
operators amnesty for any Clean Air Act violations” that the Agency uncovered through
the monitoring program.104
Another type of inducement offers exemptions from existing regulations.105 EPA’s
Project XL, established in the mid-1990s, allows the EPA to grant waivers if firms show
that they will use alternative methods of pollution reduction that will yield better
environmental results than the methods specified under current regulations.106 Intel, for
102

See generally David W. Case, The EPA’s Environmental Stewardship Initiative: Attempting to

Revitalize a Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda, 50 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (2001); Cary Coglianese &
Jennifer Nash, Policy Options for Improving Environmental Management in the Private Sector, 44
ENVIRONMENT 10 (November 2002) (describing government programs to recognize best practices).
103

Jennifer Lee, Neighbors of Vast Hog Farms Say Foul Air Endangers Their Health, New York Times,

May 11, 2003.
104

Id.

105

See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward

a Bounded Pragmatism, 97 MINN. L. REV. 943, 965-970 (2003).
106

See EPA, Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 23, 1995).
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example, devised an alternative strategy for reducing air pollution at one of its Arizona
semiconductor facilities in exchange for the EPA’s waiving certain regulatory permitting
requirements.107 Project XL was designed in part to provide the EPA with information
about alternative environmental strategies that the agency could use to develop new
environmental regulations or revise old ones.108 Firms applying for waivers must provide
the EPA with a substantial amount of information about the alternative strategies they
propose and submit to an ongoing monitoring regimen.109
Both the EPA and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) also
offer public recognition as an inducement to gather information from firms that exhibit
107

See John H. Cushman, Jr., E.P.A. and Arizona Factory Agree on Innovative Regulatory Plan, N. Y.

TIMES, Nov. 20, 1996, at A18. See also Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, The Risks and the
Advantages of Agency Discretion: Evidence from EPA's Project XL, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 67
(1998-99); Daniel Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation: The Case for an Industry
Sector Approach, 26 ENVTL. L. 457 (1996); Allen Blackman & Jan Mazurek, The Cost of Developing SiteSpecific Environmental Regulations: Evidence from EPA's Project XL, Resources for the Future
Discussion Paper No. 99-35 (Apr. 1999).
108

Thomas E. Caballero, Project XL: Making It Legal, Making It Work, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 399 (1998)

(“The Clinton administration conceived Project XL as a means of experimenting with new methods of
controlling and reducing pollution through pilot projects. The knowledge gained from the projects was
supposed to facilitate the modification of environmental regulations and controls.”).

For a further

discussion of the purposes of Project XL, see Dennis D. Hirsch, Project XL and the Special Case: The
EPA's Untold Success Story, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219, 220-227 (2001); ALFRED A. MARCUS, ET AL.,
REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM PROJECT XL (2002).
109

See EPA, 60 Fed. Reg. at 27,287 (noting that one of the requirements is monitoring, reporting and

evaluation of the program).
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best practices in environmental and workplace safety management. OSHA’s Voluntary
Protection Programs (VPP), created in 1982, has more than 1,000 member facilities
nationwide.110 Under the VPP program, OSHA exempts from regular inspections
employers who demonstrate a strong record in health and safety and have approved
health and safety programs in place.111 As part of the application process, OSHA
conducts a rigorous “pre-approval review” that provides the agency with information
about firms’ health and safety measures.112 OSHA also goes on-site to inspect the
employer’s past safety records, review its policies and procedures for ensuring health and
safety, and interview managers and employees about the policies and controls.113 These
visits ensure that facilities meet the program requirements; they also allow OSHA to
secure a great deal of information about workplace safety that it then can use to identify
problems at nonparticipating firms. The participating firms, in return, escape from the
regular rulebook inspections. In 1993, EPA launched an Environmental Leadership
Program (ELP), modeled on OSHA’s VPP, which recognized industrial facilities that had
delivered exemplary environmental results.114 This program, and other EPA programs
like it, eventually grew into what the EPA now calls its National Environmental
110

See Voluntary Protection Programs To Supplement Enforcement and To Provide Safe and Healthful

Working Conditions, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,025 (Jul. 2, 1982).
111

See id. at 29,029. Of course, OSHA still reviews worker complaints and accidents and retains its

enforcement authority if the site is not meeting its regulatory obligations. See id. at 29,030.
112

See id. at 29,030; see also Michael, supra note 28, at 559-61 (discussing generally the requirements for

the program).
113

See 47 Fed. Reg. at 29,030.

114

See Environmental Leadership Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 4,802 (Jan. 15, 1993).
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Performance Track (NEPT), which recognizes more than 300 facilities across the nation
for their environmental excellence.115
Facilities that are admitted into OSHA’s VPP and EPA’s Performance Track are
eligible to join membership associations – the VPP Participants Association and the
Performance Track Participants Association, respectively – that have regular meetings
with the agencies, benefiting both the industry members and the agencies. Regulators
report that that they have learned valuable information from these programs about
industry practices and management techniques.116 As one EPA official summed up the
information value from programs like Performance Track, “We need people we can talk
to.”

D. Nonmandatory Information Requests

Regulators can ask firms to provide information without offering any rewards or
threatening any penalties. OMB estimates that 21.9 percent of authorized information
collection requests “are voluntary where a response is entirely discretionary and has no

115

EPA, National Environmental Performance Track Basic Information, available at

http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/about.htm. Other forerunners to Performance Track included the
Strategic Goals Program in the metal finishing sector and the StarTrack program implemented in EPA
Region 1.
116

See David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor

Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 955 (2001).
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direct effect on any benefit or privilege for the respondent.”117 Undoubtedly, many more
such requests are either made without authorization or do not rise to the level where
OMB authorization is needed.
Regulators often send voluntary surveys to firms to collect data on regulatory
problems, industry conditions, and the financial costs of regulation. For example, the
EPA has surveyed regulated water systems about every five years since 1976,118
collecting information about the current conditions of water systems to help it calculate
the costs of drinking water regulations and assess any potential needs for new water
quality technologies.119 In 2000, the agency surveyed about 1,800 different water
systems, mailing surveys to about 1,200 medium and large systems and sending
representatives from consulting firms to collect data in person from 600 small systems.
The response rate for the small systems was 90 percent, while the rate for all systems was
69 percent.120

117

OMB, supra note 77, at 7 (emphasis in original). Even though such requests are technically

nonbinding, some firms may perceive that they have little choice but to cooperate. We mean to address
here those instances where firms truly do have (and perceive that they have) a choice about whether to
disclose, acknowledging that in many cases what looks like a voluntary request may well be tacitly backed
up in subtle ways with some threat of punitive response for those who do not participate.
118

Agency Information Collection Activities: Proposed Collection; Comment Request; Community Water

System Survey, 65 FED. REG. 7544 (Feb. 15, 2000) (describing the purpose and design of the survey).
119

Id. at 7545.

120

See Community Water System Survey 2000, at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/consumer/cwss_2000_

volume_i.pdf, at p. vi.

- 52 -

In the late 1980s, OSHA surveyed more than 5,000 companies on the use of personal
protective equipment (PPE) in various industrial sectors.121 The results enabled OSHA to
identify workplace risks, determine the feasibility of new or revised standards, and
provide a baseline for assessing the effectiveness of any regulatory changes.122 To help
ensure the adequacy and accuracy of responses, OSHA conducted the survey by
telephone and used strict measures to protect the confidentiality of survey responses.123
Regulators can also ask firms to submit to voluntary inspections. Following
September 11, 2001, EPA asked several dozen chemical facilities to submit to site visits
so the agency could gather information about the adequacy of security practices at
chemical facilities, as well as assess security vulnerabilities and identify potential
solutions.124 EPA currently has little or no legal authority to compel firms to submit to
such inspections, but was able to elicit cooperation from a few facilities. The FDA

121

See Agency Information Collection Activities Under OMB Review; Personal Protective Equipment,

Survey, 53 FED. REG. 28,462 (Jul. 28, 1988). Personal protective equipment includes items such as safety
goggles and hearing protectors.
122

Id.

123

Even purely voluntary surveys must still receive approval by the OMB under the Paperwork Reduction

Act (PRA) (44 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq). See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Paperwork Redux: The (Stronger)
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 49 ADMIN L. REV. 111, 115 (1997). The burden on responding
companies with respect to cost and time is one factor that OMB considers when deciding whether to
approve information collection requests by agencies.
124

Robert Westervelt, GAO Calls for National Chemical Security Plan, Chemical Week, March 26, 2003,

at 7; Neil Franz, ACC Pushes for Compromise on Security Legislation, Chemical Week, December 18,
2002, at 12; EPA Addresses Chemical Site Security, Slowly, Occupational Hazards, February 2003.
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similarly had no authority to inspect cigarette plants, but once Commissioner Kessler
began to take an interest in regulating tobacco, the CEO of Philip Morris agreed to show
FDA around one of his company’s facilities.125 Until that visit, “no one on the team
[developing the FDA rule] had ever been inside a tobacco manufacturing plant.”126
Regulators need to be mindful of when the generalizability of their findings is suspect
from surveys or site inspections. While regulations bind all the firms within a sector,
firms may be most eager to volunteer information when they are unlike their competitors.
Regulators must also worry about the accuracy of self-reported survey results, as firms’
responses may be biased.

E. Formal Interaction

Formal interaction between industry and regulatory officials provides another mode
of gathering information. Formal interaction takes place in public and usually follows a
variety of procedural steps. Examples include public hearings, where agency staff sit and
listen to testimony from industry,127 and the written comments that industry and others

125

KESSLER, supra note 31, at 140-41. Of course, this probably is an example of the situation noted supra,

in note 116, where a firm’s cooperation was not strictly voluntary. Given the background threat of the
FDA regulating tobacco, Philip Morris most likely was using this gesture of voluntary disclosure in an
effort to stave off or at least mitigate FDA’s regulatory initiative.
126

Id. at 141.

127

Public hearings can take place as part of what is known as “formal rulemaking” under the

Administrative Procedure Act, but proceedings that require this on-the-record, trial-type procedure are
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submit to the agency during the rulemaking process.128 Industry tends to submit the
largest proportion of comments in most rulemakings, comments that are filled with
extensive data, suggestions, and objections that can sometimes span hundreds of pages
(and are undoubtedly mostly self-serving).129 All written comments and transcripts from
hearings are documented in an agency’s records and are available to the public.130
The approximately 1,000 advisory committees established by federal regulatory
agencies provide another opportunity for formal interaction.131 Congress has recognized

relatively rare. However, public hearings can also be used to provide supplementary input into so-called
“informal” or “notice-and-comment” rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
128

The drafters of the Administrative Procedure Act, which specifies that agencies provide opportunities

for public comment, specifically had in mind that the “the objective should be to assure informed
administrative action.” Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947).
129

See Cary Coglianese, supra note 6, at 741 (noting that “industry groups (i.e., business firms and trade

associations) participated the most” in the comment process); WESLEY MAGAT ALAN KRUPNICK, &
WINSTON HARRINGTON, RULES IN THE MAKING 40 (1986); Marissa Golden, Interest Groups in the Rulemaking Process: Who Participates? Which Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 252, 253
(1998).
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Anyone interested in the information must still visit the agency to obtain it, at least for most agencies.

A few agencies, like EPA and the Department of Transportation, have begun to post all their comments in
Internet-accessible dockets. Within a few years, regulatory comments submitted to all agencies will
probably be accessible on-line.
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General Services Administration, FACA Database, available at http://fido.gov/facadatabase/default.asp

See also General Services Administration, Annual Report of the President on Federal Advisory
Committees. The number of advisory bodies is actually larger than the widely cited figure of 1,000
because some advisory committees have distinct subcommittees or other associated working groups.
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that such advisory groups “are frequently a useful and beneficial means of furnishing
expert advice, ideas, and diverse opinions.”132 The Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), for example, uses the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee “to obtain
direct, firsthand information and insight from the substantially affected interests by
meeting together and exchanging ideas with respect to proposed rules and existing
rules.”133 ARAC advises the FAA on most major policy issues, including equipment
safety, flight crew training, communication systems, and aircraft noise. The FAA
believes this information enables the agency to craft “better rules in less overall time.”134
In 1994, the EPA established a new advisory committee that met regularly for several
years in an effort to identify innovative approaches to environmental regulation across six
industrial sectors.135 Called the Common Sense Initiative (CSI) Council, the advisory
committee included about 30 representatives from industry, trade associations, state and
local government, labor, environmental groups, and community organizations.136 In

132

Id. at § 2.

133

ARAC Charter.

134

Id. DOT employs similar committees, with similar objectives, in its other branches, such as the

Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) used by the Federal Railroad Administration and the
Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee (THLPSSC) used by the Office of
Pipeline Safety.
135

Common Sense Initiative Council Federal Advisory Committee; Establishment, 59 FED. REG. 55,117

(Nov. 3, 1994).
136

See David W. Case, The EPA’s Environmental Stewardship Initiative: Attempting to Revitalize a

Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda, 50 EMORY L.J. 1, 43 (1993) (discussing generally the CSI
program).
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addition, subcommittees were created for each of the six sectors included in CSI: metal
finishing, computers and electronics, automobile manufacturing, printing, petroleum
refining, and iron and steel.137 Although the CSI process did not ultimately lead to major
changes in environmental regulation, it did help inform EPA policymakers about
technical issues in each of its industrial sectors.138 Indeed, much of the activity
undertaken in the Common Sense Initiative consisted of research and information
collection.139
Formal interaction enables regulators to gather information, but the openness
associated with these processes can limit the sharing of information. As with gossip in
everyday life, information transmission to regulators is more efficient through less formal
137

See Katherine Bouma, Metal Finishers Try EPA Program, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 27, 1998, at A7.

138

Cary Coglianese & Laurie Allen, Building Sector-Based Consensus: A Review of the EPA’s Common

Sense Initiative, in THEO DE BRUIJN & VICKI NORBERG-BOHM, EDS., INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION
(forthcoming). Some observers of consensus-based advisory committees like CSI have argued that these
processes help provide regulatory decision makers with better information. See, e.g., Neil Eisner,
Regulatory Negotiation: A Real World Experience, 31 FED. BAR N. & J. 371, 374 (1984) (concluding that a
negotiated rulemaking advisory committee established by the FAA resulted in deliberations that “were
informative” and that “a better understanding of the problems was developed on all sides”). It far from
clear, however, whether information disclosure is significantly increased when advisory committees are
charged with reaching a consensus on a regulatory proposal. Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 386, 442 (2001) (noting that forms of interaction not
organized around consensus provide the same kinds of opportunities for public input and that “it is the
deliberation—not the consensus—that generates the information that enables agencies to craft their policy
decisions”).
139

Id. at Table 2.
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interaction. Advisory committees, which must include members of competing interests
and be open to the public, inhibit frank informational exchange between regulators and
industry.140 While procedures that promote openness may well help address concerns
about illegitimate influence by industry on government policy making,141 they can
hamper the ability to gather information from industry.142

140

Ashley C. Brown, Sunshine May Cloud Good Decision Making, FORUM APPL. RES. & PUB. POL.

(1992). The burden associated with establishing FACA committees may also limit the extent to which they
are used by regulators. Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and
Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 549 (1997). Whenever agencies convene a series of ongoing
meetings with a group of industry or other nongovernmental representatives, they must follow the
requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 1-15. The requirements
under FACA do not apply to the individual and sporadic meetings with industry that take place most
frequently in regulatory policy making. See Croley & Funk, supra at 453. FACA requires agencies to have
balanced committee memberships drawn from different interest groups, that meetings be announced in
advance and open to the public, and that the agency take accurate minutes of the committee’s proceedings.
5 U.S.C. §§5(b)(2), 10(a)(3), & 10(c). For example, OMB must approve all new proposals for advisory
committees. Management of Federal Advisory Committees, O.M.B. Circ. No. A-135 (Oct. 5, 1994). OMB
has also established ceilings for the number of advisory committees. Id.
141

Croley & Funk, supra note 139, at 453 (noting that in enacting FACA Congress’s attempted to address

concerns that “some interests had come to enjoy unchecked and perhaps illicit access to federal executive
decisionmakers.”).
142

See infra Part IV.
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F. Informal Interaction

Informal interaction, which is not nearly as visible as formal exchange, is a staple of
regulatory life.143 It often takes place by telephone. In a recent rulemaking proceeding
on motorcycle brake systems, a staff member at NHTSA called up a representative at the
motorcycle trade association to learn more about the effect of temperature on the friction
between brake linings and discs.144 Informal communication also takes place in person,
in meetings regulators hold with individual representatives from industry, and in working
groups of such representatives arranged so that they skirt the requirements of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act.145 Regulators interact with industry at professional meetings,
143

Over fifty percent of the Washington interest groups surveyed by Neil Kerwin and Scott Furlong

reported that government proactively initiated contact with their organizations “on a regular basis.”
CORNELIUS KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 189
(3d ed. 2003). According to Kerwin, “a common reason for these contacts is to get information for the rule
under development.” Id. See also Home Box Office v. Federal Communications Commission, 567 F. 2d 9,
57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (describing “informal contacts between agencies and the public [as] the ‘bread and
butter’ of the process of administration”).
144

Memorandum of George Soodoo, Division Leader, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,

Docket NHTSA-99-6472-7 (June 18, 2001).
145

FACA does not apply to all meetings between regulators and industry. For example, agency officials

are permitted to meet alone with an individual, because an individual cannot be a committee. See 41 C.F.R.
§ 101-6.1004(h) (meeting initiated by President or agency to seek advice from single individual not subject
to FACA). Moreover, the General Services Administration (GSA), which has been charged with
implementing FACA throughout the federal government, explicitly excludes from its definition of advisory
committee any meeting where “the purpose is the exchanging of facts or information” as opposed to giving
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academic conferences, and wherever both industry and government representatives are
present.146
Government regulators and industry representatives often develop relationships over
periods of years, or even decades, and will work closely with each other on the
development of regulations.147 As one EPA staff member explained:

We try to bring them in as early as possible on what we are required to do and
request their help very early on. And usually this is appreciated because that
way they have input as opposed to EPA unilaterally going out and looking at
various textbooks and writing rules that are ridiculous because we don’t fully
advice or making recommendation. 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1004(l). See also 5 U.S.C. § 3(2) (defining an
advisory committee as one that is “established or utilized…in the interest of obtaining advice or
recommendations”). But see Croley & Funk, supra note 139, at 488 (questioning GSA’s interpretation).
Even meetings where advice is given can be excluded from FACA if the advice is given individually by
participants, as opposed to meetings that lead to collective recommendations. See Croley & Funk, supra
note 139, at 474; 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1004(i). Finally, to fall under FACA, meetings need to be held more
than once, so ad hoc or one-time meetings generally do not need to meet FACA’s requirements. See
Croley & Funk, supra note 139, at 483-84.
146

Coglianese, supra note 6, at 750. An excellent example of a setting that was specifically designed to

promote such informal interaction is the Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG), established by our
colleague, Professor William Hogan. HEPG brings together representatives from industry, government,
academe, and environmental groups for discussions aimed at “informing and analyzing” policy
development. Harvard Electricity Policy Group, Reshaping the Electricity Industry: A Public Policy
Debate (June 2001).
147

See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline, L & POL. (1987).
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understand what the hell we are regulating. So it works out better by working
very closely with the people that we are going to regulate and we do this in
various ways. We meet with them; we have industry-agency workgroups that
will meet together.148

Another EPA staff member expressed the same thought: “The more information
[industry] can help us with, the better the rule will turn out – in their interest as well as
everyone else’s.”149
Industry representatives in Washington also seek out information from regulators and
try to learn of opportunities to influence the shape of regulatory policy.150 As one
corporate vice-president for regulatory affairs remarked:

Our Washington office – they know the regulators down in the bowels of the
agency personally. They are over there all the time, they’ve become friends
with them, they supply data and assist them in any way that it’s legitimate to do.
So we have open communications constantly about what they’re thinking, what

148

Coglianese, supra note 6, at 751.

149

Id.

150

Political scientists who study the role of interest groups in policy making have long acknowledged that

lobbyists traffic in information. See LEWIS ANTHONY DEXTER, HOW ORGANIZATIONS ARE REPRESENTED
IN WASHINGTON

130 (1969) (“The effective Washington representative provides influence for his client by

acquiring and translating relevant information.”).
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we’d like them to do, what we think they’re gonna do. It’s almost like
becoming joined at the hip with the staff over there.151

In this way, informal interaction serves industry’s interests as well as government’s
needs, which means that regulators are in a position to offer information about their plans
to industry in exchange for industry providing government with information.152
While in formal regulatory proceedings conducted through a trial-type hearing, such
so-called ex parte communications are prohibited under § 557(d)(1) of the
Administrative Procedure Act, there is no corresponding provision for ex parte
communications during informal or notice-and-comment rulemaking. The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals’ controversial decision in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,153 although
construed narrowly by subsequent courts,154 has been reinforced by agency policies

151

Coglianese, supra note 6, at 751.

152

Id. at 750 (noting that “informational dependence … lead[s] interest group representatives and agency

staff to find themselves engaged in ongoing and often mutually beneficial relationships”).
153

567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“If ex parte contacts [occur after the issuance of a notice of proposed

rulemaking], we think that any written document or a summary of any oral communication must be placed
in the public file established for each rulemaking docket immediately after the communication is received
so that interested parties may comment thereon.”); see also id. (“[C]ommunications which are received
prior to issuance of a formal notice of rulemaking do not, in general, have to be put in a public file.”).
154

United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied 453 U.S. 913

(1981) (declining to apply ex parte requirement in Home Box Office to OSHA notice-and-comment
rulemaking); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (declining to follow Home Box Office
requirement in EPA notice-and-comment rulemaking).
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requiring the documentation of informal contacts that take place after the publication of a
notice of proposed rulemaking.155 Even though some agencies require their staff to
document all ex parte communications whenever they occur; it is extremely difficult to
ensure that staff members comply fully with these requirements. In addition, the
memoranda that agency staff members prepare to describe their ex parte communications
are often quite brief and general. Since the informal communications frequently involve
contact with only a single agency staff member, there is often no way to know for sure
whether documentation of ex parte communications is complete. The upshot is that
informal contacts with industry continue to take place largely below the radar, especially
prior to the filing of a notice of proposed rulemaking.156
One additional pattern of interaction deserves mention: the so-called “revolving
door.”157 When regulators move from government into jobs within industry, this
facilitates future informal contacts between the regulatory agency and relevant firms or
trade associations. When people move from industry into government, this facilitates
informal contacts and brings insider’s knowledge about an industry into a regulatory
155

See, e.g., Department of Transportation Order No. 2100.2 (1970) (requiring prompt and public

documentation of ex parte communications after the publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking);
Environmental Protection Agency, Administrator’s Memorandum of May 31, 1985 (requiring agency staff
to place in the docket “a memorandum summarizing any significant new factual data or information likely
to affect the final decision received during a meeting or other conversations”).
156

Cf. Coglianese, supra note 6, at 75 (“In the rule development phase, industry groups tend to dominate

because of the information they can provide to the agency staff as they write a rule.”).
157

See, e.g., William T. Gormley, Jr., A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC, 23 AMER. J.

POL. SCI. 665 (1979).

- 63 -

agency. FDA Commissioner David Kessler made sure to include on the cigarette
regulation project an FDA staff member who had previously worked for “the other side”
– the tobacco industry.158

IV. The Implications of Information Gathering

How can regulators best use the information-gathering tactics at their disposal to
gather reliable information from firms that would prefer to remain silent? In this Part, we
connect the information-gathering tactics presented in Part III with the general
informational strategy developed in Part II, emphasizing the strategic advantages of
informal interactions with industry. These advantages lead to some striking implications
for administrative law, which we explain in the final section. For at least the past three
decades, administrative law has promoted greater procedural transparency of government
decision making to discourage regulatory capture and other special deals between
regulators and the firms they regulate.159 However, the potential adverse impacts of
transparency and formalism on government’s ability to collect essential information from
industry have been generally overlooked.

158

159

KESSLER, supra note 31, at 125.
See infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
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A. Connecting Tactics with Strategies

Which of the various information-gathering tactics exploit asymmetries of interests
across or within firms, and which create incentives for disclosure? Some of the tactics
clearly match up with regulators’ two basic strategies. Issuing subpoenas and rewarding
disclosure are obvious ways to create incentives. Nonmandatory requests for information
clearly seek to exploit asymmetries of interest, as the firms or facilities that open
themselves up to voluntary inspection by the regulator, or that voluntarily respond to
information requests, presumably have an interest in being forthright with the
regulator.160
The connection between strategy and the other tactics may seem less clear, at least at
first glance. Making regulatory decisions contingent on disclosure might appear to
reward firms for disclosing information, since firms only obtain their license or
regulatory approval after they have provided the regulator with information. But in fact,
firms are rewarded only for disclosing a certain kind of information -- information
favorable to the firm -- not when they disclose adverse information showing their
products or drugs are unsafe. The cases of fraud in FDA applications for new drugs
indicate that the tactic of conditioning approval on disclosure does not really help the
160

Moreover, the fact that surveys or inspections are treated confidentially means that participating firms

can usually transmit information without fear of any reprisals from others in their industry. In some cases,
others will know that the agency is asking for information, but they will generally never be able to identify
what information has actually been conveyed or by whom.
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regulator obtain information that most industrial players would prefer it not to have.161
Linking approval to disclosure exacerbates industry’s predisposition to disclose selfserving information.
Conditioning decisions on disclosure works best when firms’ disclosure interests are
asymmetric – say if the information that helps one firm win regulatory approval also
helps the regulator in regulating other firms in the future, on the same or some other
issue. When the FDA relied on information submitted with tobacco company patent
applications, it actually exploited an asymmetry in interest that cut across time.162 When
they submitted patent applications, tobacco companies had an interest in disclosing
information about their ability to manipulate nicotine to the Patent Office; they may not
have even envisioned that a different regulator, the FDA, would later use that information
against them in trying to regulate cigarettes. Similarly, in large, compartmentalized
organizations, individuals in one office may release certain information when applying
for regulatory approvals falling within their domain, overlooking or underestimating the
negative implications for future policy making or on regulatory matters outside their
purview.
The tactic of formal interaction serves neither of the regulators’ main strategies very
well. It generally places regulators in a relatively passive role in which they receive
information but do not actively seek it. While information is obviously transmitted in
public hearings and formal comment periods, it is only information that the parties want
them to receive, not necessarily the information that regulators most need. As with
161

See supra note 80 and accompanying text.

162

See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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respondents to nonmandatory requests for information, those who attend hearings or take
the time to file comments are a self-selected group of interested parties. Moreover,
unlike nonmandatory requests, formal modes of interaction such as hearings and
comment processes are open-ended, so the regulator often cannot effectively direct the
subject matter of the inquiry. It is hard to see how regulators could use such passive
modes to exploit asymmetric incentives or create new ones.163
Other types of formal interaction, such as advisory committees, may better enable
regulators to exploit asymmetries or create incentives for firms to reveal adverse
information. Since membership on an advisory committee can reward firms by giving
them greater access to the agency, the ability to appoint members to these committees in
principle allows regulators to reward firms that have a track record of providing reliable
and useful information. However, a variety of factors constrain the effectiveness of
advisory committees. Once a committee is constituted, regulators have little opportunity
within the confines of the formal process to reward firms that reveal needed information
during committee deliberations. Any “deals” that the regulator might like to make with
individuals firms are inhibited by the transparency of the advisory committee process.
Moreover, advisory committees must represent a balanced collection of members, so that

163

See John Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizen Advisory Boards in Environmental

Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. 901 (1998) (“While procedures like public hearings can be a good
opportunity for many people to hear presentations, to express their views, and perhaps to engage in
question-and-answer sessions, they cannot provide the forum for extensive development of information.”).
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regulators cannot merely appoint members from firms that reveal information.164 Most
important, the requirement that advisory committee deliberations remain open to the
public means that any firm’s decision to break an industry’s collective silence would be
known to those who could punish that firm.165 For these reasons, advisory committees do
not provide regulators with a powerful tool for breaking industry silence. Surely the
FDA never would have gathered much information for its cigarette rulemaking by
appointing tobacco representatives to an advisory committee.
The chief contribution of advisory committees may be, ironically, to facilitate
informal interactions. Even though regulators may not learn much from the formal
meetings of advisory committees, these sessions do give regulators and industry
representatives opportunities to get to know each other and build relationships that can
lead to productive informal interaction. In many cases, the most valuable

164

41 C.F.R. §101-6.1007 (requiring agency plan to ensure that the agency strives “to attain fairly balanced

membership”). Of course, some advisory committees will be more wide-ranging than others, just given the
make-up of the interest group community around the issue. On those issues that are relatively obscure or
technical, and where the interest group universe is relatively tight, it might be possible for regulators to
choose precisely the actors most likely to disclose. On issues where there is a broader and more conflicted
range of interests, this will be harder to achieve.
165

5 U.S.C. §10. To be sure, agencies can always interact with the members of advisory committees on an

individual basis, outside of the open committee process. In some cases, regulators may use the formal
process as a vehicle for forging closer relationships with potential sources of information who the
regulators then approach individually and informally outside of the advisory committee process. For
further discussion of using a mixture of tactics for securing information, see infra Part II.D.
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communications among members of advisory committees take place in the hallways
before or after the formal meetings or during breaks.166
Informal interaction provides excellent opportunities for regulators to use both
information-gathering strategies. They can telephone those whom they believe are more
disposed to talk – and reward firms that participate through informal trades. The quid pro
quos can consist of information from the agency or potentially desirable treatment in
regulatory action. Agencies can also informally punish firms that refuse to disclose
information by reducing access to the agency or subtly slowing the agency’s
responsiveness on other matters to those. We develop the virtues of informal interaction
more fully in the next section.167
To summarize, Table 1 shows the connections between the basic informational
strategies and the six main tactics. To create incentives for disclosure, the best tactics are
(1) mandating disclosure, (2) creating rewards for disclosure (such as by establishing
recognition programs like EPA’s Performance Track), and (3) engaging in more subtle
manipulation of interests through informal interaction. When regulators seek to exploit
asymmetries, they should (1) issue nonmandatory requests and take advantage of the
information provided by volunteers, or (2) seek firms more inclined to disclose through
informal (and hence more hidden) interaction. Relying on information provided in
licensing or other approval processes where decisions are conditioned on disclosure will
166

See Ellen Siegler, Regulatory Negotiations: A Practical Perspective, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L.

INST.) 10,647, 10,648-49 (Oct. 1992) (observing from personal experience that extensive communication
takes place outside of the public sessions of negotiated rulemaking advisory committees).
167

See infra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
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generally only help for policy issues that are more tangentially related to the approval
processes. Finally, formal interaction, though perhaps serving purposes other than
information acquisition, generally will not effectively advance either strategy for
gathering adverse information.

Table 1. Potential Contributions of Information Tactics to Strategies

Strategy
Tactic
Contingent Decisions
Mandated Disclosure
Rewards and Recognition
Nonmandatory Requests
Formal Interaction
Informal Interaction

Exploit
Asymmetries
Medium
Low
Low
High
Medium
High

Create
Incentives
Low
High
High
Low
Low
High

B. The Virtues of Informality

Throughout the world, proponents of good government favor increased transparency
(and thus usually formality) in regulatory decision making.168 Informality is often
viewed as suspect by reviewing courts and others who fear that government’s informal
168

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD REPORT ON

REGULATORY REFORM: SYNTHESIS (1997) (noting that “[l]ack of transparency is a key problem” in OECD
countries). See also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, STRENGTHENING
REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY: INSIGHTS FOR THE GATS FROM THE REGULATORY REFORM COUNTRY
REVIEWS, OECD TD/TC/WP (99)43/FINAL (April 12, 2000) (discussing the importance of transparency in
domestic regulatory systems).
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interaction with industry will result in regulatory policies that favor industry over the
broader interests of society.169 Yet from the standpoint of information collection, these
fears are misplaced: industry will not hesitate to provide the government with the kind of
information that would support policies that favor industry, whether the process is formal
or informal.170 To obtain information needed to advance society’s interests at the
expense of industry interests, in those cases where this is desirable, regulators must
exploit or create different interests in disclosure, strategies that are actually made more
cumbersome by formal, transparent processes. Whatever the drawbacks to informality, it
possesses distinct advantages for extracting adverse information.171

169

See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2267 (noting that

interaction taking place in “informal and nontransparent ways” has led to “concerns about inequalities of
interest group access and resulting agency capture.”); Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975) (noting that because “bias in agency policies is often
attributed to informal decisions, courts have imposed requirements that force agencies to adopt formal
procedures”).
170

Of course, the concern may less with information than with firms using informality to offer explicit or

implicit bribes to government officials. We discuss implicit trades for information in more detail in Part
IV.D.
171

See KERWIN, RULEMAKING, supra note 142, at 192 (noting that “informal mechanisms and difficult-to-

observe mechanisms for communicating views to agencies are used a great deal and are thought to be as or
more effective than traditional means – such as written comment – that figure so prominently in the
procedural law and academic literature on rulemaking”); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F2d at 401 (“Informal
contacts may enable to the agency to . . . spur the provision of information which the agency needs.”).
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Informal interaction enables regulators to be more proactive and nimble in their
efforts to gather information, partly due to the lower costs associated with informality.172
It is very easy to pick up the phone and call a contact in industry. It is also usually less
costly to craft and calibrate incentives when proceeding informally. Simply failing to
return a phone call or to invite a trade association representative to an important meeting
are cheap ways to punish an uncooperative firm. Returning phone calls, sharing
information about agency initiatives, or involving industry in key meetings are cheap
ways to reward cooperative firms.173
Informality also preserves the regulator’s discretion and protects the privacy of
communications, allowing regulators to target discretely those firms that are more likely
to disclose. Information disclosure is less visible when it is informal, so that informants
who break industry’s collective silence can be better protected against retribution. The
opaque nature of informal interaction allows regulators to create incentives for disclosure
without being accused of having created special deals, which they are in fact making, or
of having treated firms unfairly by punishing them for failing to share information.174

172

See supra notes 142-69 and accompanying text.

173

These rewards and punishments may seem insignificant, but to firms in heavily regulated industries, the

loss of reciprocal cooperation can be quite significant. These players know that even though they may
make strenuous substantive objections to agency proposals, it is not in their interest to play hardball with
regulatory staff. Coglianese, supra note 6.
174

Making the case for punishing nondisclosure is usually difficult. After all, if a firm failed to disclose

information, is that because there was nothing to disclose or because the firm was uncooperative? See
supra note 110-111 and accompanying text. Since the “crime” of nondisclosure or inadequate disclosure
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Regulators and industry representatives who interact with each other repeatedly will
tacitly understand the incentives that regulators create informally, but these same
incentives will often be nearly invisible to others.
The opaque nature of informal interaction helps to preserve deniability. Though
deniability can be used to hide actions that are illegal or inconsistent with the public
interest, it is also extremely helpful for whistleblowers, firms that volunteer information
adverse to others in their industry, and public-interested regulators who need to make
deals to gain needed information. The pressures that work against the revelation of
adverse information can be significant, so the ability to communicate confidentially
increases the likelihood that some socially valuable information will be transmitted.
Deniability is especially important for representatives of trade associations, who often
negotiate with both the agency and the managers and firms that they represent.175 In
order to win the favor of regulators, trade association representatives will sometimes
provide information off the record, such as about industry’s general “bottom line.”
Individual lobbyists sometimes privately tell regulators that their industry will not resist a
specific policy provision, even as they maintain a public posture of resistance. As with
leaks of government information to the press, those who provide the information to the
government often need to preserve deniability for what they have disclosed.

seldom has its corpus delecti (dead body), regulators’ efforts at punishment for nondisclosure will often be
susceptible to charges of unfairness.
175

Cary Coglianese, Unequal Representation: Membership Input and Interest Group Decisions

(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/prg/cary/unequal.htm.
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Much more than with formal interaction, informal interaction allows government to
derive information from the behavior of firms, not just from what they say. Regulators
draw inferences about the intensity of different firms’ interests from the extent of their
involvement on specific regulatory issues.176 Such intensities are better uncovered by
informal processes, in which firms choose their own level of participation, than in formal
processes which – due to their focus on fairness –tend to foster equal levels of
participation.
Extensive and active resistance to a regulation suggests that an industry, or the firms
within it, have information that the regulation will impose high compliance costs.177
Firms will overstate these costs, but reveal their intensity through their observable
lobbying efforts.178 Moreover, when informal relationships with government are
ongoing, firms are more constrained in their ability to overstate – they cannot repeatedly
threaten that they are going to close down in the face of regulatory action without losing
credibility.
For these reasons, regulators should rely on informal tactics before resorting to formal
ones. Even when they are insufficient, informal tactics can inform regulators’ use of
176

RICHARD L. HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS 3, 7, 237 (1996) (discussing the role of intensities of

interests).
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See Johnston, supra note 12.
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Regulators do not need to see the lobbyists’ actual expenditures to draw these inferences, as has

sometimes been suggested. Matthew D. Adler, The Positive Political Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis: A
Comment on Johnston, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 1429, 1442-43 (2002). Instead, regulators can gauge a firm’s
relative level of interest by comparing its lobbying on one issue with its lobbying on other issues -- or with
lobbying by other firms of comparable size on other issues.
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other tactics, such as issuing subpoenas. To issue effective mandatory information
requests, regulators need to know what to ask, and informal, off-the-record conversations
can point the way. For example, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer took
advantage of informal tips provided by industry insiders to lay the groundwork for
several formal investigations of financial markets by his office and the Securities and
Exchange Commission.179

C. Discerning Truth from a Position of Ignorance

Information collection is ultimately about finding truth. How do regulators judge
whether they have obtained accurate information? As former FDA Commissioner David
Kessler has commented, “Because we did not understand exactly what we were looking
for, we did not know how to press the company for more information. And when the
company gave us answers, we had no way to challenge them.”180 While this problem can
never be fully overcome, it can be addressed in two ways.
179

See, e.g., Abigail Rayner, Ten-Minute Call Sparked Inquiry, The Times, Dec. 10,. 2003, at 33. The

charges filed against Putnam Investments for market timing followed a tip-off by an employee at a Putnam
call-center to Massachusetts’ regulators. John Hechinger, How One Call Taker Spurred the Putnam
Mutual-Fund Case, The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 28, 2003, at C1.
180

KESSLER, supra note 31, 182 (2001). This problem is compounded when, as happens on many important

regulatory issues, regulators actually have before them an abundance of bits of data given to them by
industry, for they need to know which of these bits are accurate and relevant. This is why, earlier in this
article, in defining the problem of collective “silence,” we made a point to acknowledge that we were
making a simplifying assumption in treating disclosure as a binary choice. See infra note 41 and
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The first is to draw upon multiple sources of information. (Social scientists call this
triangulation.)181 If different sources and methods generate reasonably consistent
answers, then regulators can have greater confidence in the accuracy of the
information.182 If the information proves inconsistent, regulators must consider the
interests of those providing information and their reputations for credibility.
When regulators routinely seek out multiple sources of information, firms have an
added incentive to be honest, knowing that others will provide a check on what they

accompanying text. Even if this assumption were to be relaxed, the problem we have elucidated in this
article remains basically the same. The collective silence problem we have addressed here is not
necessarily a problem of getting industry to say something at all, but rather of getting them to say
something accurate when doing so would ordinarily be against their interests.
181

Alan Bryman, Triangulation, in MICHAEL LEWIS-BECK ET AL., EDS., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL

SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS (forthcoming), available at http://www.referenceworld.com/sage/socialscience/triangulation.pdf.
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If the information is not consistent, regulators should consider the interests of those providing the

information and their reputations for credibility. If some firms provide data showing that a regulation will
be extremely costly, but other similar firms in the same industry provide data showing that it will not be as
costly, regulators might appropriately discount the data provided by the first set of firms, as claims of high
compliance costs are self-serving. The claims by firms reporting lower compliance costs will be properly
viewed as more credible, all other things being equal. On the other hand, if industry reports that
compliance costs will be high but consumer or environmental activists provide information indicating that
the costs will be low, then without anything further regulators will be unable to adjudicate between the two
claims, since the information provided by consumer groups would also be self-serving.
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say.183 In addition, the more sources the regulator approaches, the more likely one or
more will squeal. Not surprisingly, regulators and former regulators have told us that
they gather information by pursuing many different avenues, seeking information from
multiple sources. They vet information gathered from one source with other sources; use
information obtained through one tactic to bolster and refine other tactics; and sometimes
bring parties with disparate interests together to test competing claims in informal,
adversarial meetings.184
Regulators can also improve the reliability of information by fostering closer and
longer relationships with industry. While close, ongoing relationships between regulators
and industry have long been deplored, often characterized pejoratively as “cozy iron
triangles,”185 they also allow regulators and representatives from industry to learn to
cooperate with each other and gain a basis for establishing credibility and trust.186 A firm
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This can also serve as a check on any “groupthink” bias that might emerge over time in government’s

ongoing relationships with industry.
184
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See Coglianese, supra note 6, at 749-53. Interestingly, the original work on the evolution of cooperation

came from an analysis of iterated play of the prisoner’s dilemma, a game that in its original formulation is
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may wish to distort information given to the regulator in any given round of the
regulatory game, but if the regulator uncovers a deception it can retaliate against the firm
(albeit perhaps in subtle ways) in later rounds. For heavily regulated industries, regulators
are civil servants who tend to remain in their positions for a long time; hence, the shadow
of the future will be long.187

D. Implications for Administrative Law

For at least the past half-century, social scientists and legal scholars have viewed
closeness between regulators and industry as a matter of concern, a problem to overcome
through the design of administrative law.188 Closeness has implied influence and bias,
the risk of regulatory capture, and the creation of regulatory policy that systematically
favors the interests of industry.189 As a result, administrative law has through the years

really all about the disclosure of information. See AXELROD, supra note 100; Parson, Zeckhauser &
Coglianese, supra note 7.
187

See Coglianese, supra note 6, at 753.
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(1979); Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669
(1975).
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Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Administrative State, 105 HARV. L. REV.

1511, 1565 (1992) (“According to the capture hypothesis, instead of providing meaningful input into
deliberation about the public interest, industry representatives co-opt governmental regulatory power in
order to satisfy their private desires.”).
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aimed to make the regulatory process more transparent, with little concern for the
regulator’s information deficit.190
Congress has pronounced that it is “the policy of the United States that the public is
entitled to the fullest practicable information regarding the decisionmaking processes of
the Federal Government.”191 This general commitment runs throughout administrative
law. For example, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) establishes a presumption
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Slater Steels Corp. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1379 (Ct. Intl. Trade 2003) (“Agency

transparency is a cornerstone of administrative law.”); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and
the Need for a New Administrative Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 125, 147 (2003) (“Administrative
law has always been grounded upon basic norms. These norms include transparency, participation, and
fairness.”); Martin Shapiro, Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance,
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that government records will be accessible to the public.192 The Government in Sunshine
Act and the Federal Advisory Committee Act require that critical regulatory meetings be
announced in advance and made open to the public.193 Regulators are expected to
document ex parte communications that occur after the publication of a notice of
proposed rulemaking.194 In addition, regulators must provide reasons for their policies
and must base their decisions on an administrative record that is available to the public as
well as to courts and members of Congress.195
These rules aim to prevent abuses and systematic bias, which are genuine concerns.196
Nevertheless, they also hobble the ability of well-intentionedregulators to secure the
reliable information they need to make better decisions. Administrative law
developments that make the regulatory process more transparent dampen the leverage the
regulator has over industry in the information game. For example, under the Regulatory
192

5 U.S.C. § 552.

193
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Flexibility Act, agencies must publish information twice a year about all the regulations it
has in development,197 and FOIA obligates agencies to disclose internal agency
documents whenever industry requests them.198 These laws weaken the regulator’s
position vis-à-vis industry in the information game, even though they do serve important
values in a democracy. In the absence of these laws, regulators could be more selective
about sharing such information, providing it more readily to those who in return provide
the agency with information it needs.199
Transparency can also undercut the regulator’s ability to elicit information from firms
that might fear retribution. Regulators do not want to risk exposing their best sources of
information within industry, any more than those who work for national security and
intelligence agencies want to risk exposing their sources. A bit of opacity protects the
privacy of sources, and may allow firms or their representatives to be more forthcoming
and honest about sharing adverse information.

(“[T]ransparency is coming to be recognized as essential to good governance and to establishment of the
rule of law within ordered societies.”).
197

5 U.S.C. §§601-612 (1994 and Supp. III 1997).

198
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“joined at the hip” with the regulatory agency. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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Requiring complete transparency about virtually every conversation in government,
though perhaps now technologically possible, would make regulators’ jobs much more
difficult. What is needed is neither total transparency nor total opacity, but rather a mix
that mitigates the risk of regulatory bias, whether from cognitive bias or outright
corruption, and preserves some room for regulators to interact privately with industry in
order to pry open industry’s collective silence.
Despite administrative law’s overall trend toward transparency, a few procedural
features still leave some room for regulators to play the information game. For example,
agency procedures, as well as the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Home Box Office, do
not prohibit ex parte communications altogether, nor do they generally require agency
staff members to document all of their ex parte communications.200 Rather, they only
require documentation of those communications taking place after the agency issues a
proposed rule.201 Not surprisingly, interest groups have come to engage in extensive
informal communication with regulators before any proposed rules are announced.202
Even FOIA preserves some protection for the privacy of business information by
exempting certain types of records from required disclosure, including national security
documents, personnel records, and trade secrets or other confidential business
information.203 Significantly, the D.C. Circuit, concerned with the impact of disclosure
on future government efforts to secure information, has held that FOIA requires
200

See supra notes 152-54.

201
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202
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203
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additional protection for confidential business information that industry voluntarily
provides to government.204 Congress has also recently added new protections against
disclosure under FOIA for confidential information provided voluntarily by industry on
“critical infrastructure,” such as telecommunications, energy, financial, and transportation
systems.205 These measures strike a balance between openness and government’s need to
protect industry’s confidential exchange of information with government regulators.206
Against administrative law’s overall march toward greater transparency, these
measures stand out in their recognition of how government regulators must acquire
information from industry. While transparency has important virtues, some level of
informality and confidentiality is also needed if government is to preserve its ability to
play the information game effectively.
204
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Richard B. Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, United States Supreme Court, No.
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Despite noting this, we recognize that informal relationships between regulators and
industry may well bring problems, and that transparency offers important virtues.
Indeed, our analysis of the information game leads us to call attention to an important but
frequently overlooked tradeoff facing administrative law. The challenge is to minimize
the sum of two competing types of errors: (1) those associated with agency bias and
nefarious conduct, and (2) those associated with regulators’ failure to secure necessary
information. Recognizing the tradeoff involved in addressing these competing errors is
an important step. It opens up a major avenue for future research; ultimately it should
make it easier to find solutions that minimize the sum of the two error types.207 Such
solutions may vary across agencies and regulatory problems, but they will involve
striking some balance between opacity and transparency.
One kind of balance could be struck by keeping parts of the regulatory process
confidential, but only for limited periods. After the period of confidentiality had lapsed
(say, after three to five years), agencies would need to release records of their
communications with outsiders. Assurance of confidentiality might give sufficient cover
to facilitate information exchange, but general awareness of a subsequent release could
counteract temptations to abuse secrecy.
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Another option is to keep parts of the regulatory process opaque but impose penalties
for demonstrably objectionable conduct.208 Given that opacity can be expected to lead to
informal trading in information, greater care should be taken to avoid coercion or corrupt
actions. Thus, auditing for such abuses by senior managers, agency inspector generals, or
the General Accounting Office should be in place, along with adequate penalties.
A final approach is to preserve pockets of opacity in a process that demands reasoned
explanations, based on an open agency record, for each new regulation. Agency officials
can talk secretly with industry to ferret out adverse information; however, information
critical to any new regulation still needs to form part of the agency’s public justification.
As a result, any leads or information obtained through opaque channels subsequently
should be corroborated through more open means, including the possibility of mandated
disclosure. Such an approach fits well with the current presumption of the availability of
judicial review. As a check on abuse, courts, legislators, and other overseers demand
reasoned explanations of agencies’ regulatory decisions.209
The tradeoff between protecting against bias and ensuring regulators obtain necessary
information means that transparency should not become transcendent in administrative
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law. Rather, the goal for administrative law lies in balancing between transparency and
opacity along the lines of one or more of the alternatives we have outlined.

Conclusion

Regulators must rely on industry for significant amounts of information they need to
craft effective and efficient regulatory policies. However, it is often not in a firm’s or an
industry’s interest to provide that information. By working closely and informally with
industry, regulators can identify specific firms or employees whose interests in disclosure
might differ from those of their competitors. Regulators can also try to create incentives
– rewards and punishments – that might lead some firms to break with the industry’s
collective silence. Both strategies are easier to pursue when regulators can interact
informally with industry in ways that are not transparent to others, including the overall
public.
Much attention has been given in recent years to the need for improving the analytical
and scientific basis of regulatory policy making. Congress and the executive branch have
required regulatory agencies to engage in more careful policy analysis before issuing new
rules. While these efforts have merit, the value of regulatory analysis ultimately depends
on the quality and reliability of the information on which it is based. The challenge of
securing essential information for regulators’ decisions is a fundamental one for anyone
interested in improving the quality of regulatory decision making.
Meeting this challenge will require resisting any temptation toward enforced total
transparency. Transparency combats the dangers of cozy relationships between
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regulators and industry, to be sure, but it also detracts from regulators’ abilities to exploit
asymmetries of interest across firms and to engage in informal interactions. The
challenge for administrative law is therefore to find an optimal level of visibility,
balancing the values served by transparency against regulators’ need to employ behindthe-scenes measures to obtain information from those they regulate. Striking the right
balance will require recognizing that sometimes government best advances the public
interest by giving industry rewards in exchange for information or engaging in informal,
off-the-record conversations, even though this behavior may appear indistinguishable
from the kind of corruption or regulatory capture that administrative law has long sought
to prevent. Ensuring that regulators can secure accurate information therefore calls for
sophisticated regulatory practices that allow regulators to extract information yet seek to
counteract the kind of regulatory capture that has long been properly deplored.
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